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Abstract
The main purpose of this thesis is to extend the theoretical knowledge on the
relationship between the nancial and the real sectors. Specically, we inves-
tigate how the allocation of capital aects the dynamics of macroeconomic
cycles and the long-term growth rate. Indeed, given the position of nancial
intermediaries between the demand and the supply of loanable funds, banks
can change the market equilibrium inuencing the choices of households and
rms. Moreover, also the competitive pressure arising from incumbent insti-
tutions can play a major role in the denition of the nal outcome.
First, we develop a computational agent-based model, where the chan-
neling of funds from savers to investors occurring through intermediaries is
aected by information frictions. Since banks compete in both the deposit
and the loan markets, the whole dynamics is driven by endogenous uctua-
tions in the size of the intermediaries balance sheet. Accordingly, the intro-
duction of an interbank market, reducing the pressure on the liability side
of banks' balance sheets, improves the performance of the system. However,
the result depends on the topology of the network. Indeed, the functioning
of a highly centralized nancial system relies on the current state of the hub
and vice-versa.
Lastly, we develop a simple general equilibrium model to study the eects
of nancialization on aggregate growth and systemic risk. The main driver
of this process is the bargaining power of intermediaries. Indeed, nancial
institutions, by absorbing a larger quota of income from entrepreneurs, can
reduce the incentive for new rms to enter the market. As a result, both the
long-term potential growth rate and the overall stability of the system can
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The nancial sector plays a fundamental role in ensuring the correct and
ecient functioning of modern economies. Indeed, it can enhance both the
resilience to shocks and the growth prospects of a Country through an optimal
allocation of resources. However, the Great Recession in 2009 showed, after
nearly a century from the Great Depression, that nance can also be the
source of severe instability and widespread economic downturns.
The main aim of this thesis is thus to study how the nancial and, in par-
ticular, the credit sectors aect the overall performance of the real economy.
Specically, we investigate the eects of the mechanism of capital alloca-
tion on the dynamic of macroeconomic cycles and on the long-run potential
growth rate. Indeed, given the position of nancial intermediaries between
the demand and the supply of loanable funds, banks can modify the market
equilibrium by inuencing the choices of households and rms. Moreover,
also the competitive pressure arising from incumbent institutions can play a
major role in the denition of the nal result. Therefore, the focus of this
work is on the feedback mechanisms within the nancial sector and between
the latter and the real one.
The thesis is a collection of three articles which concentrate on various as-
pects of this topic and employ dierent methodologies to obtain and analyze
the results. Specically, in the rst two chapters we rely on the agent-based
literature to investigate the role of the nancial sector on the formation of
economic cycles. Indeed, macroeconomic dynamics can emerge endogenously
through this methodology because of the localized interactions of hetero-
geneous agents (see, for example, Delli Gatti et al. (2005) and Tesfatsion
(2006)). Accordingly, agent-based models (ABM) seem to be the natural
choice to analyze economic uctuations. On the contrary, in the last chapter
we introduce a representative agent framework to study the eects of banks'
bargaining power on aggregate growth and systemic risk. In fact, in this
case, the focus is on the static properties of the economy rather than on its
dynamic features.
As stated before, in the rst chapter we develop a macroeconomic model
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with decentralized matching in which resources ow from households to rms
through nancial institutions. Specically, we implement an ABM in which
families and entrepreneurs move from an intermediary to another one without
any constraint. As a result, banks react to changes in their demand for
credit and their supply of deposit modifying their interest rates. Overall,
we nd that the decentralized mechanism of capital reallocation can produce
endogenous uctuations in the system. Indeed, the competitive pressure on
the asset and liability side of banks' balance sheets can give rise to a strategic
complementarity in the behavior of intermediaries. Moreover, the continuous
creation and destruction of credit lines can modify the aggregate productivity
of the economy, thus leading to further amplication of cycles.
The second chapter extends the preceding work by including an inter-
bank market. Moreover, we modify the model introducing a preferential
attachment mechanism whereby agents react to reductions in the t of their
existing counterparty by switching to a new one (Bianconi and Barabási,
2001). Indeed, this framework allow us to analyze our results on the basis
of network theory (as in Delli Gatti et al. (2010), Riccetti et al. (2013) and
Lenzu and Tedeschi (2012)). Overall, the new specication of the model
conrms the idea that the interbank market can be an indisputable source
of economic development. In fact, counterbalancing depositors movements,
it can dampen the continuous creation and destruction of credit lines, thus
reducing the implicit loss of banks' informational capital and increasing the
overall eciency of the system. Nevertheless, that result depends on the
topology of the network. Indeed, a highly centralized nancial market can
amplify the eects of exogenous shocks in the economy. In fact, in that sit-
uation, the state of the system heavily relies on the overall eciency of the
core bank and vice-versa.
Lastly, the third chapter introduces a representative agent model to study
the eects of nancialization on aggregate growth and systemic risk. Speci-
cally, the idea is to provide an explanation for the parallel development of the
nancial sector, the reduction of aggregate growth and the overall increase in
nancial fragility of Western economies during the last three decades (Palley,
2013). We nd that the main driver of this process can be the bargaining
power of intermediaries. Indeed, nancial institutions, by absorbing a larger
quota of income from entrepreneurs, can reduce the incentive for new rms
to enter the market. As a result, both the long-term growth rate and the





Credit to non-nancial businesses and households is notoriously pro-cyclical
(Covas and Haan, 2011; Schularick and Taylor, 2012), a fact that in the last
three decades has attracted a huge amount of theoretical work meant to
explore the channels linking nancial ows to real macroeconomic activity
(Foglia et al., 2011). The received pre-2007 approach was centered on the
idea that the causality runs from changes in the real sector to movements in
nancial ows, whereas nancial frictions impinging on the borrowers' capac-
ity amplify the macroeconomic impact of exogenous shocks to productivity
or preferences (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993;
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). In turn, the bulk of the research emerged after
the global nancial crisis has oered theories pointing toward an inversion
of the causality nexus. In the models surveyed in e.g. Brunnermeier et al.
(2013) and Christiano and Ikeda (2011), a shrinkage in the total amount
of funds channeled from lenders to borrowers derives from disruptions in
nancial markets due to shocks aecting either banks' capital or liquidity.
Recessions are therefore the outcome of a cut in spending and hiring by
borrowers generated by a supply-induced credit tightening.
In this paper we present an agent-based computational model in which
the owing of funds from savers to investors is intermediated by a stream
of banks competing in fully decentralized markets for deposits and loans,
where the only friction aecting agents is that they are imperfectly aware of
the economic opportunities they potentially face. In our setting, the trans-
mission channel between the nancial and the real sectors turns out to be
bidirectional, while cyclical uctuations emerge endogenously as intermedi-
aries adjust the size of their balance sheet to the varying competitive condi-
tions aecting the asset and liability sides, respectively. In particular, banks
compete on prices either to attract demand deposits from households and to
oer long-term  but freely severable - credit contracts to rms, so that the
net interest margin represents a key state variable indicating the viability
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of the banking sector while transforming maturities. Due to search costs in
locating protable opportunities, the economy is aected by matching and
allocation imperfections that co-evolve endogenously, giving rise to large re-
allocations of credit among rms on a regular basis. The dynamics of credit
creation and destruction are related to the relative strength of economic ac-
tivity, however. This is due to the ensuing complementarity between the
number of active bank-rm relationships and the savers' incentive to provide
funds to intermediaries, which returns a pro-cyclical average productivity.
The time paths we obtain through simulations show that the statistical fea-
tures of the gross ows of credit, as well as its aggregate volume, are in line
with those observed in real data. Interestingly enough, this result is obtained
in a simplied framework completely abstracting from agency frictions, ag-
gregate disturbances to primitive parameters, time-varying risk taking due
to capital regulation or institutional arrangements like a deposit guarantee
or a LOLR authority.
Having established the general features of the relationship linking the
credit and the business cycles, we go on to investigate how a nancial crisis
 here modelled as a funding run leading to the disruption of one or more
banks  aects the macroeconomic performance. We nd that the interplay
of credit creation and destruction associated to a nancial turmoil generates
downturns that are deeper and more prolonged, that the subsequent rebound
can be insucient to regain pre-crises output levels, and that these eects are
more pronounced when the nancial crisis coincides with a real downturn.
Thus, our model presents two implications corroborated by the empirical
evidence: 1) nancial crisis can lead to permanent output losses (Boysen-
Hogrefe et al., 2016); 2) banking crises operate as a factor limiting aggregate
activity distinct from standard recessions (Dell'Ariccia et al., 2008).
While close in spirit to the stream of research dealing with equilibrium
search in credit markets (Diamond, 1990; Den Haan et al., 2003; Wasmer
and Weil, 2004; Becsi et al., 2013), our model is rmly rooted in the tradi-
tion of the agent-based literature exploring the emergence of macroeconomic
features from the localized interactions of heterogeneous agents employing
decentralized matching and bargaining protocols (Fagiolo et al., 2004; Gaeo
et al., 2008, 2015; Riccetti et al., 2015; Guerini et al., 2018). This approach
oers us two key advantages. First, we can extend the macroeconomic-
oriented analysis of credit allocation from a static multiple equilibria frame-
work to a dynamic one, where credit mismatches develop from feedback ef-
fects as agents interact in distinct but interrelated customer markets (Got-
tfries, 1991). Second, beyond overcoming the need to postulate an exogenously-
given matching technology, we provide accurate sensitivity analyses to an-
alyze how macroeconomic outcomes are aected by banks' behavior in ex-
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tending credit.
Our ndings are also related to two other broad streams of literature.
First, a large body of empirical research has persuasively shown that the
dynamic process of credit reallocation across heterogeneous rms is an intense
and pervasive phenomenon, that its magnitude and volatility dwarf that of
the total volume of credit, and that it plays a signicant role in determining
the strength of macroeconomic activity and real growth rates (Jayaratne and
Strahan, 1996; Herrera et al., 2011; Inklaar et al., 2015). The reshuing of
nancial resources across rms due to the creation and destruction of bank
debt is particularly compressed during episodes of nancial turmoil (Contessi
and Francis, 2013; Hyun, 2016), signalling that the interplay between resource
misallocation and the endogenous worsening of nancial frictions is at the
heart of the deep and prolonged periods of low resource utilization following
acute nancial crises (Hall, 2011; Bordo and Haubrich, 2017).
We add to this essentially empirical literature by providing a theoretical
justication for these stylized facts. In particular, we show that the intense
credit reallocation observed in real data can be traced back not only to the
way intermediaries compete in the market for loans, but also to the feedback
exerted on it by the fact that banks also struggle to attract depositors as
they set their passive interest rates.
Second, a rapidly growing body of work has stressed the role of nancial
intermediaries' balance sheets both as shock ampliers and as a source of
uctuations in economic activity (Boyarchenko and Adrian, 2015; Brunner-
meier and Koby, 2016). Accordingly, using data for the USA Adrian and Shin
(2010) show how uctuations in the balance sheets of nancial institutions
possess forecasting power for future GDP growth, while the evidence pro-
vided by Adrian et al. (2010) suggests the presence of a causal chain running
from the term spread, moving to the net interest margin of banks, advancing
to lending volumes and nally reaching real growth. We complement this
literature by highlighting a dierent channel linking uctuations in the size
of intermediaries' balance sheets and uctuations in real activity. In addi-
tion to the risk-taking and the leverage channels explored so far, we advance
an explanation in which the net interest margin registered by banks evolves
in cycles because of a competition channel driven by a complementarity
between nancial intermediation and aggregate investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the
model and provides a discussion of the initial conditions used in simulations.
Section 1.3 takes stock of simulation results to highlight the existence of
endogenous and co-evolving business and nancial cycles. Section 1.4 extends
the basic model by examining the eects of exogenously determined bank
runs. Section 1.5 concludes and outlines directions for further research.
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1.2 Model
The economy is composed of a xed number of households (h = 1, . . . , nh),
intermediaries (i = 1, . . . , ni) and rms (f = 1, . . . , nf ). Households are en-
dowed with accumulable wealth, which we assume for simplicity as the only
factor of production, while rms have no resources of their own and must
raise funds on the credit market to start production. Families deposit their
wealth in only one intermediary at a time as demand deposits and cannot
establish direct connections with producing rms. Here we are implicitly
assuming that investments evaluation and ex-post verication are costly and
intermediaries are more ecient than households in performing these tasks.
In addition, we assume that the nancial sector can supply credit without
sustaining any additional eort or expense. On the other hand, households
can always search a new counterpart and move their wealth from an inter-
mediary to another one without any constraint.
As in Den Haan et al. (2003), intermediaries supply credit to rms through
a simple contract in which a xed portion of production (Pi,f ) is left to the
entrepreneurs as payment for the eort. Notice that this value measures both
the protability (Pi,f ) and the cost of nancing (ri,f = [f(ki,f )− Pi,f ]/ki,f )
of the company, where f(·) is the production function and ki,f is the exter-
nal nance supplied by the i-th intermediary to the f-th rm. Accordingly,
entrepreneurs search and choose the banks paying the highest contractual
prots.
The level of prot (Pi,f ) and the loan size (ki,f ) are set at the beginning
of the open-ended credit relation and are not modied through time1. With
regards to the latter, we assume that the value of new issuances is extracted
at random from a pre-dened distribution. Indeed, the idea is to model
the implicit informational capital of banks through this mechanism (Stiglitz,
2015b). In fact, we assume that intermediaries do not know the optimal size of
loans. However, when they need additional money to repay depositors, they
reduce their assets starting from sub-optimal investments. Consequently,
the eciency of the banks' portfolios increases over time because of this
asymmetric mechanism of credit allocation2.
As stated before, rms can move to another counterpart whenever they
observe a more attractive nancing opportunity in the market. In this case,
the credit line is closed and the funds returned to the intermediary. However,
entrepreneurs do not consider exclusively contractual prots in this choice.
1Entrepreneur which are not borrowing have Pi,f = θ and ki,f = 0, where θ is the
reserve utility, which we dene later in the text.
2In other words, new issuances can return both high and low interest rates, while the
loans held in the portfolio are only the most protable ones.
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Specically, we assume that rms have a reserve utility (θ) and sustain a cost
(x) each time they search for a new counterparty. Notice that the reserve
utility can be interpreted as a home production level, which is not included
in the aggregate production calculations. Therefore, entrepreneurs have the
incentive to demand credit and start a new market activity only if the ex-
ternally nanced rm returns an expected prot higher than their reserve
value. To further simplify the model, we assume also that both the home
and the market activities require the same level of eort from entrepreneurs.
Consequently, the reserve utility and the search cost are the only factors af-
fecting entrepreneurs' choices. Moreover, we force intermediaries to nance
the search cost of new lenders for the rst period (see Table 1.1). As a
result, the value of the rm and, consequently, of the credit relationship in-
crease through time, in line with the literature on relationship banking (see
e.g. Boot (2000) for a review).
Overall, intermediaries react to the behavior of households and rms
in this framework. From the liability side, families can move their wealth
between intermediaries without any constraint, while on the asset side en-
trepreneurs can shift from the current lender to a new one every time they
observe a better nancing opportunity in the market.
As stated before, rms must take into account search costs in this choice.
In particular, an entrepreneur look for a new counterpart if3





where we assume that rms discount future cash ows considering the current
market interest rate (Rt) as xed and constant through time. In addition,
entrepreneurs use average prots (Pt) as a proxy for evaluating new loans and
do not take into account the probability of future rescissions of the contract.
1.2.1 Model Initialization
At the beginning of the world, families have an homogeneous quantity of
wealth dh,0 = W0 (∀h = 1, . . . , nh) which they deposit in a bank selected at
random. We dene the subset of households connected to the i-th interme-
diary at time t as Hi,t. Hence, for t = 0 we have: Pr(h ∈ Hi,0) = U(1, ni),
where U(·) is a uniform distribution.
Intermediaries set the initial contractual prot Pi,0 = θ + xR0, x a
3Firms which have just started a new credit relation (t = 1) must satisfy the condition:
E[search]− E[not search] = PtRt −
Pi,f
Rt
+ xRt ≥ 0 (see Table 1.1).
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minimum investment dimension k̄i,0, evaluate the resources available for in-
vestments and generate a credit supply schedule4.
We dene the minimum investment dimension as the lowest value of cap-
ital producing a non negative interest rate: k̄i,t = { k | f(k)− Pi,t = 0}. We
set this constraint to avoid negative returns, which increase excessively the
volatility of simulations and, because of this, occasionally produce degenerate
equilibria in which only one intermediary remains in the market5. However,
from a theoretical point of view, this assumption allows us to dene deposits
as truly risk-free, in the sense that the capital quota is always repaid.
As stated before, the credit supply of every intermediary is computed ac-
cording to a stochastic allocation process. The quantity of available resources







the size of new loans is extracted from the distribution:





(knewj + x) (1.3)
is satised6.
Lastly, rms demand for funds and start production. Given that at this
stage all the intermediaries oer the same contractual prot, we allocate
credit across entrepreneurs at random. In other words, we extract the com-
position of the initial credit network with probabilities: Pr(f ∈ Fi,0) =
U(1, ni) · U(1, nf ), where Fi,t is the set of rms connected with the i-th in-
termediary at time t.
1.2.2 Sequence of Events
Once the system starts, the economy evolves recursively following the subse-
quent steps in each iteration:
4We set the initial contractual prot equal to Pi,0 = θ + xR0 to start the model with
a value equal to the long term zero prot condition:
Pi,0
R0
= θR0 + x.
5Degenerate equilibria are usually the eects of an excessive reactivity of the system
in the early stages of the simulation. A possible solution to this problem would have been
the use of a larger number of agents to avoid initial jumps and have a smoother transition.
However, the system would have become excessively costly from a computational point of
view.
6We dene Inewi as the set of new loans supplied by the i-th intermediary.
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2. Intermediaries collect the stream of income produced by their invest-
ments and calculate the active interest rate:
rai,t =
∑
f∈Fi,t−1 ri,f · ki,f +
∑
f∈Fi,t−1∧f /∈Fi,t−2 ri,f · x∑
f∈Fi,t−1 ki,f
(1.6)
and its counterpart on deposits:
rdi,t =
∑
f∈Fi,t−1 ri,f · ki,f +
∑
f∈Fi,t−1∧f /∈Fi,t−2 ri,f · x∑
h∈Hi,t−1 dh,t−1
(1.7)
where the return obtained from the nancing of search costs is included
only for new loans
(
f ∈ Fi,t−1 ∧ f /∈ Fi,t−2
)
.
























and we consider the latter as the reference interest rate of the en-
trepreneurs (Rt = R
d
t , see Eq. 1.1).
3. Households observe the return obtained on deposits, consume and allo-
cate capital. Specically, families receive the interest rate paid by their
corresponding intermediary, namely rh,t = r
d
i,t with h ∈ Hi,t (see Eq.









s.t. dh,t+s + ch,t+s = (1 + rh,t+s)dh,t+s−1 (1.11)
whose solutions are:
ch,t = (1− β)(1 + rh,t)dh,t−1 (1.12)
dh,t = β(1 + rh,t)dh,t−1 (1.13)
Subsequently, households search at random a new intermediary such
that rdnew,t ≥ rdi,t, which implies: h /∈ Hi,t ∧ h ∈ Hnew,t.
Notice that the combination of this mechanism with the minimum in-
vestment condition ensures that families always allocate their wealth
to an active intermediary. In fact, banks without deposits do not have
the resources to supply credit and do not pay any interest. On the con-
trary, intermediaries with an active balance sheet can return a positive,
even if low, income stream to their depositors.
Therefore, non-performing banks can only exit from the economy in
this framework. Indeed, households slowly withdraw all deposits from
sub-optimal intermediaries, up to the point when all the resources are
completely depleted. From that moment on, families do not select those
intermediaries anymore because of the zero interest rate. Consequently,
this condition guarantees the emergence of an endogenous bargaining
power among the agents.
4. Intermediaries evaluate liquidity, modify the contractual prot on new
loans and supply credit.
The term liquidity (Li,t) indicates the amount of unallocated resources
available for investments in each intermediary at the beginning of every
period. This value is given by the dierence between the current level of









When an intermediary experiences an excessive withdrawal of funds,
namely when Li,t < 0, it has to reduce lending to repay depositors.
Therefore, the bank evaluates the interest rate of each investment and
close the contracts with the lowest returns until the condition∑
f∈Fi,t−1
k̃i,f + Li,t ≥ 0 (1.15)
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is satised, where k̃i,f are the credit lines with the minimum protabil-
ity.
Subsequently, intermediaries modify the contractual prot that they












+1 if Ui,t−1 ≥ k̄i,t−1 + x
−1 otherwise
When an intermediary observes an increase in the total amount of
deposits, it keeps the contractual prot at the level of the previous
period. In fact, it recognizes that it is paying an interest rate higher
than the rest of the economy and that it is optimal not to modify the
conditions which produced that result.
Conversely, when it experiences a withdrawal of deposits, the inter-
mediary must understand why it is not able to pay a suciently high
return to its depositors. The main driver of this decision is the amount
of unallocated capital (Ui,t−1) accrued in the preceding period. Notice
that it is always optimal for the single intermediary to invest all the
available resources to obtain a non-negative interest rate. Hence, an ex-
cess of uninvested funds  dened here as a positive dierence between
the overall quantity of unallocated resources and the minimum invest-
ment dimension plus the nancing of the search cost (Ui,t−1 ≥ k̄i,t−1+x)
 indicates that the bank is not oering a suciently competitive con-
tractual prot to the rms. In the opposite situation, the intermediary
recognizes that it is leaving an excessively high quota of production
to the entrepreneurs and is obtaining a sub-optimal return from its
investments.
Lastly, as in the initialization phase of the economy, intermediaries
compute the minimum investment dimension of the new contractual
prot (Pi,t) and extract the size of each new loan from the distribution:
knewj ∼U(k̄i,t, K̄i,t), with K̄i,t =
∑
f∈Fi,t−1 k̃i,f + Li,t.
5. Firms observe the average contractual prot and evaluate the oppor-
tunity cost of changing their counterparts.













and is updated each time a rm borrows from a bank. Specically,
the order of rms acceding to the credit market is extracted at random
and when a new loan is issued it is removed from the credit supply
schedule. Entrepreneurs evaluate the potential benet of borrowing
from a new intermediary through equation (1.1) and, if positive, they
look for another counterpart such that:
Pz,t
Rt
− x ≥ Pi,f
Rt
(1.18)
which implies: f /∈ Fi,t ∧ f ∈ Fz,t, Pi,f = Pz,t and ki,f = knewj , with
j ∈ Inewz .
6. When the credit supply is completely depleted or there is no more












where they subtract also the nancing of new borrowers' search costs.
1.2.3 Margin of Intermediation and Cash Reserves
As we will explain later in the text, it is necessary to focus both on the
dynamic of the interest rate dierential and on the denitions of liquidity and
unallocated capital to understand the circumstances behind the endogenous
formation of credit cycles.
Starting from the margin of intermediation, the balance sheet equation














Accordingly, the aggregate interest rate dierential is a function of the overall










Hence, both a rise in contractual prots and a decline in rms productivity,
by reducing the active interest rate, shrink the margin of intermediation. In
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a similar manner, a contraction in the level of unallocated capital decrease
the interest rate dierential.
With regards to the equations of liquidity (1.14) and unallocated capital
(1.19), it may appear that they represent the same economic dimension. To
better understand the dierences between those measures and their economic
intuition, it is useful to rewrite them in terms of their past values. Specically,







ki,f + Li,t (1.22)
where we removed for simplicity the nancing of the search costs of new
borrowers. Similarly, by taking (1.19) with one period lag and by substituting







dh,t−1 + Ui,t−1 (1.23)
The new versions of the two equations put under the light the main
drivers of the underlying economic dynamic. Specically, with regards to
the unallocated capital (Ui,t), it emerges that, given the current level of
liquidity, entrepreneurs' movements across the intermediaries determine the
overall amount of uninvested funds left in banks (Fi,t−1 → Fi,t). Conversely,
the resources available for supplying new credit (Li,t) are the result of the
households' investment decisions (Hi,t−1 → Hi,t). In other words, movements
in the level of unallocated capital (Ui,t) capture the changes in the asset side
of the intermediaries' balance sheets, while adjustments in the liquidity (Li,t)
provide a proxy for the evolution of banks' liabilities.
1.3 Simulation Results
In this section we discuss the results obtained from the simulation of the
model. Specically, we focus on the eects of the parameters on the determi-
nation of the pseudo steady-state level of the economy and on the dynamic
of the endogenous cycles of the system.
1.3.1 Initial Setting and Sensitivity Analysis
As in all agent-based model, parameters play a major role in the denition of
the results and in the emergence of endogenous dynamics. We hold particular
attention to the eects on the system of the rms' reserve utility θ and
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of the intermediaries' contractual adjustment factor γ. Indeed, these two
parameters modify not only the shape of the cycles and the response of the
economy to a bank run but also the pseudo steady-state level of the system.
Conversely, with regards to the search cost x, simulations show that
changes in the size of this value produce only second-order eects (Fig. 1.3).
Indeed, from the point of view of the entrepreneur, this cost is relatively
small compared to the expected value of the rm (see Table 1.1 and Eq. 1.1
and 1.18). Given that interest rates are close to zero near the pseudo steady-
state, also the product xRt becomes irrelevant, thus dampening the eects
of this friction on the economy. In addition, also banks and depositors are
indierent to the size of search costs. Indeed, they obtain a positive return
through their funding. However, the existence itself of this friction modies
the dynamics of the system. In fact, when entrepreneurs evaluate the bene-
ts of searching a new counterpart, they can only observe the average prot
paid on new loans (Eq. 1.1). For this reason, a large number of new credits
with low protability can hide good investment opportunities. Therefore, the
outcome is an increased persistence of cycles. In the light of these results, we
set the search cost close to zero (x = ε)7 to maintain its eect on the economy
and to minimize the degree of subjectivity in the decisional process.
We set a suciently high number of households (nh = 2000) and rms
(nf = 2000), while we limit the quantity of intermediaries (ni = 50) to keep
the computational complexity of the model at an acceptable level. If on the
one hand this choice produces slightly irregular initial transition phases, on
the other one it returns reasonable results in the long run. Households pa-
rameters are set inside a realistic range. In particular, we choose a discount
factor β = 0.95 and an initial capital W0 = 0.1. With regards to the pro-
duction function, we use a common functional form with decreasing marginal
productivity: f(k) = kα, where α = 0.3. Lastly, we study the pseudo steady-
state level of the system on a range of the rms' reserve utility θ = [0.05, 1.0]
and of the intermediaries' contractual adjustment factor γ = [0.05, 1.0].
Notice that we set an upper bound for the entrepreneurs' reserve utility
equal to one. This is due to the intrinsic characteristic of the interest rate















7ε = 2.22× 10−16 is the machine epsilon.
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Given the discount factor β = 0.95 and the production function param-
eter α = 0.3, the maximum value of the rms' prots compatible with the
households steady-state condition (r = 1/β − 1) is equal to:






Consequently, a contractual prot over this threshold always returns an
interest rate lower than the households discount factor. Therefore, in that
situation, there is an overall withdrawal of resources by the families and, in
the long run, a collapse of the economy to an equilibrium without production
and consumption. Moreover, rms' reserve utility posit a lower constraint on
contractual prots. Indeed, values below this zero utility threshold do not
meet entrepreneurs demand. In summary, to avoid degenerate equilibria and
to leave enough decision space to intermediaries, we decide to limit the study
of the dynamic of the system up to this value of the rms' reserve utility.
Similarly, we constrain also the intermediaries' adjustment factor to an
upper bound equal to one. In fact, the range of the percentage change of the
banks' contractual prot is equal to ±100% in this case. In the view of that,
we consider this limit suciently high for our purposes.
The system converges to a positive level of production and the number
of intermediaries always remains above the degenerate equilibrium with only
one bank left in the economy (Fig. 1.2, 1.4 and 1.5). As expected, the av-
erage value of rms' prot increases with the reserve utility. Accordingly,
the higher production quota left to entrepreneurs has a negative eect on
the interest rate paid to the households and, in turn, on the accumulation of
capital and on the overall level of production (Fig. 1.2 and 1.4). Conversely,
the intermediaries' adjustment factor has a positive eect on the stability
of the economy (Fig. 1.2 and 1.6): a stronger reactivity of the nancial
system anticipates the formation of cycles and dampens their eects. How-
ever, this characteristics comes with a drawback. When the entrepreneurs'
reserve utility is high, an excessive responsiveness of intermediaries increases
the number of times that rms' prots exceed the households' steady-state
condition (Eq. 1.26). That explains the low number of nancial institutions
and the reduced level of production in those regions with high reserve utility
and high contractual adjustment factor.
To end with, notice that the level of unallocated capital in the system
increases with the rms' reserve utility and the intermediaries' adjustment
factor (Fig. 1.7). At the same time, the extra prot of rms (P − θ − xR)
decreases along those directions (Fig. 1.8). As we will explain in the next
section, this feature of the system is connected to the proximity of these
points to the no entry condition and to the maximum production limit.
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1.3.2 Credit Cycles
An emerging feature of the stylized economy introduced here is the presence
of endogenous credit cycles. To study the mechanisms behind these move-
ments and to capture all the properties of the system, we choose to analyze
an intermediate combination of parameters: {γ = 0.5 ∧ θ = 0.5}.
During periods of economic growth (Fig. 1.9), the system experiences
an increase in rms' productivity and in the average interest rate paid by
the intermediaries to the households (Fig. 1.10 and 1.11). At the same
time, the volume of unallocated resources reaches its maximum level (Fig.
1.13), the average contractual prot decreases (Fig. 1.12) and there is an
expansion in the number of new credit line and a simultaneous contraction
in loans closure (Fig. 1.14 and 1.15). Conversely, during economic downturns
(Fig. 1.9), the interest rate and rms' productivity collapse (Fig. 1.10 and
1.11), contractual prots increase (Fig. 1.12) and, in the initial phase of
the crisis, the volume of rms switching between intermediaries hikes, with
a slow process of absorption in the subsequent periods (Fig. 1.15). Finally,
the credit market experiences a fast compression, with a rise in the quantity
of intermediaries reducing the number of loans and a decline in the amount
of banks oering new lending contracts (Fig. 1.14).
The main drivers of these dynamics are the existence of a strategic com-
plementarity in the intermediaries' behavior and the presence of a strong
inter-rm competition. All these aspects are then amplied by an alloca-
tive friction which modies the productivity of investments and widens the
reactivity of the system.
To understand the logic behind these uctuations, it is useful to start
from the beginning of an expansionary phase. In that situation, interest rates
are higher than the households' discount factor and families have a strong
incentive to save. In addition, contractual prots are close to rms reserve
utility. Because of the positive conjuncture, intermediaries experience an
inow of funds and, on average, maintain the contractual prots at the level
of the previous period. From the point of view of the entrepreneurs, only new
entrants have thus the incentive to borrow at those conditions, hence leading
to a positive inow of rms. This fact, combined with a xed amount of
capital in the short run and a production function with decreasing marginal
returns, brings to an increase in the total productivity of the economy and a
rise in the total volume of production.
The incentive for all the intermediaries to maintain contractual prots
constant holds as long as the amount of unallocated resources remains rela-
tively low. Therefore, when the demand for new loans decreases, this policy
stops being optimal and a reversal in the trend starts. This happens when
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the contractual prot exceeds the zero prot condition (Fig. 1.12). However,
notice that the turnaround does not start immediately: even though there is
an excess of unallocated capital, the past increases in the overall productivity
of the system maintain interest rates above the households discount factor
(Fig. 1.10 and 1.11). Consequently, families still have the incentive to save at
a lower but positive growth rate and to avoid a sudden and unexpected with-
drawal of funds. In other words, as long as the margin of intermediation of
banks remains suciently wide, these have the opportunity and the incentive
to keep supplying new credit to rms at the current market conditions.
From a theoretical point of view, this dynamic should converge to a sta-
ble equilibrium: the combined eects of high rm productivity and excess of
capital should oset each other in the long run, producing a margin of in-
termediation and an interest rate compatible with the households' discount
factor. But the existence of a strategic complementarity in the intermedi-
aries' behavior and the presence of a strong inter-rm competition limit the
permanence of the economy at this equilibrium. Indeed, when the margin of
intermediation of banks starts to squeeze because of the natural reduction of
rms' productivity8, the single nancial institution has the incentive to in-
crease the contractual prot on new loans to attract new counterparts. From
the point of view of the intermediary, this choice has a positive eect on its
protability. In fact, it increases the eciency of its portfolio reducing the
volume of unallocated resources. However, at the level of the whole economy,
this produces a decrease in the overall productivity of the system. In fact, the
new contractual prot attracts not only new entrants but also incumbent en-
trepreneurs (Fig. 1.15). Therefore, at the aggregate level, the same amount
of capital is distributed across a smaller number of rms, with a decrease in
the total productivity of the system (Fig. 1.11). This, in turn, reduces the
interest rate paid to households (Fig. 1.10), driving them to a withdrawal of
deposits. Furthermore, this downward trend is self-reinforcing. Indeed, the
other intermediaries recognize that they are accumulating an excess of unal-
located resources because of their uncompetitive contractual prot. Hence,
their optimal policy is to increase the prot quota on new loans. This re-
sults in an upward trend in contractual prots (Fig. 1.12), a reduction in
interest rates and rms productivity (Fig. 1.10 and 1.11) and to an overall
withdrawal of resources by the households. This, in turn, produces a fast
compression of the credit market (Fig. 1.14).
Lastly, the crisis stops when most of the unallocated resources are de-
pleted and banks start to decrease contractual prots. Indeed, when an
intermediary experiences a withdraw of funds it recognizes that all its re-
8In fact, the production function has decreasing marginal returns.
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sources were invested in the preceding period and it is leaving an excessively
high production quota to the rms. Consequently, contractual prots start
to decrease and interest rates slowly rise back to a level compatible with the
households' discount factor.
In summary, the endogenous cyclicality of the system is due to the inter-
action between the behavior of intermediaries and rms. In fact, the absence
of one of these two elements would prevent the beginning of the downward
phase of the cycle. On the one hand, incumbents rms would not compete
with the new ones if the intermediaries have not supplied loans at better
conditions. On the other one, the relative interest rate of the single inter-
mediary would not rise after an increase in its contractual prot if only new
entrants have borrowed at the new price. Indeed, new rms require only
a payment higher than their reserve utility. As a result, the reduction of
the unallocated capital in the single bank and the consequent increase in its
interest rate would be insignicant.
In addition, from this study emerges that the level of unallocated re-
sources of intermediaries and the dierence between the contractual prot
and the reserve utility of rms are strictly connected to the phase of the cy-
cle. This explains why dierent sets of parameters, which are characterized
by dissimilar cyclicalities, have distinct levels of unallocated funds. In partic-
ular, economic systems featuring low volatility have also on average higher
volumes of uninvested capital and smaller dierences between contractual
prots and reserve utilities. Indeed, in those situations the interaction be-
tween rms and intermediaries maintains the uctuation of the system closer
to the zero prot condition. In fact, in that phase of the cycle the level of
unallocated capital is at its maximum level and the extra prots of the rms
are close to zero.
1.4 Bank Run and Persistent Slump
In the preceding section we show that most of the movements in the system
are the results of the interaction between rms and intermediaries. House-
holds simply react to changes in the interest rate generated by the behavior
of these agents. In this section we study the eects of a bank run, namely
a sudden and unexpected withdrawal of resources by the depositors. The
idea is to understand the role played by banks creditors in the formation and
in the destruction of lending relations. Furthermore, we investigate whether
the overall economic conditions inuence the outcomes of this event.
The simplest way to model a bank run is to constrain the deposit decision
of the households. Specically, we prevent a subset of families from depositing
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their capital after they have withdrawn it. We perform this experiment under
two dierent methodologies:
Targeted Bank Run (TBR): The subset of households belongs to a re-
stricted group of intermediaries. The idea is to completely withdraw all
the resources from a given number of banks and to interrupt all their
lending activity.
General Bank Run (GBR): Families are selected at random across all
the intermediaries. In this case, banks do not suer a complete deple-
tion of their deposits and do not close all their credit lines.
In both the experiments the volume of unallocated resources are ap-
proximately the same. In particular, we set the size of the unexpected
withdrawal of funds equal to the average ratio between liquidity and cap-
ital. Indeed, the idea is to conduct a shock whose dimensions are equiv-
alent to the normal uctuations of the system. For the TBR experiment,
we pick at random a subset of banks whose liabilities represent this capital
quota, while for the GBR we chose a group of households which hold on
overall the same amount of resources. To obtain a suciently high num-
ber of results we conduct 450 bank run of each type on a simulation of
10000 periods starting from the same random seed. The timing of the shock
is then selected casually from a timespan between 4000 and 7000 periods.
Lastly, the experiment is repeated over four dierent combinations of pa-
rameters: {γ = 0.35 ∧ θ = 0.35}, {γ = 0.35 ∧ θ = 0.7}, {γ = 0.7 ∧ θ = 0.35}
and {γ = 0.7 ∧ θ = 0.7}.
It appears that the GBR has a smaller and only temporary eect on the
economy (Fig. 1.16, 1.17, 1.18 and 1.19). The reason behind this result is
the destruction of credit lines. Indeed, by construction, the only dierence
in the two methodologies is the allocation of the bank run: while in the GBR
it is spread across all the intermediaries, in the TBR it is concentrated on a
small subset of them. Therefore, the diusion of the shock through all the
banks dampens its eects and reduces the number of credit lines which are
destroyed. This is due to the fact that, on average, there is always a positive,
even if small, amount of unallocated capital in the intermediaries' balance
sheet. Consequently, in the GBR treatment, banks have the opportunity to
draw resources from that entry rather than closing the credit lines. Con-
versely, in the TBR, all the loans connected to a specic intermediary are
closed.
This fact explains why shocks show conicting outcomes for dierent sets
of parameters. In fact, the systems in which the average level of unallocated
funds is low are subject to deeper and persistent recessions (Fig. 1.16 and
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1.18). Conversely, economies characterized by a higher level of uninvested
capital are able not only to manage properly the shock but also to improve
their steady-state performance (Fig. 1.17 and 1.19). Indeed, in these cases,
the rms suering an unexpected closure of their credit lines can immediately
borrow from another intermediary. Therefore, the economy recovers faster
and it is also able, in the short run, to allocate most of the exceeding capital
inherited from the preceding period. In this way, this indirect rationalization
of investments raises the overall productivity of the system in the long run,
with an increase in both the production level and the protability of rms.
On the contrary, in an economy with a low level of unallocated capital the
intermediaries are not able to cover the additional demand for funds. Fur-
thermore, in the subsequent periods  when the resources are reinvested in
the economy by the households  banks start to decrease their contractual
prots. Indeed, they try to improve their protability through the exploita-
tion of this temporary excess of demand. Therefore, the overall results in the
short run are a reduction of the credit demand and a persistent accumula-
tion of unallocated capital. Consequently, households have the incentive to
withdraw and consume this excess of resources and the economy converges
to a lower steady-state equilibrium in the long run.
These results are conrmed by the analysis of the recovery times, namely
the time required for the economy to reach the same level of production that it
would have been obtained if there had not been the bank run. Specically, we
regress the logarithm of the recovery time on the logarithm of the aggregate
production at the moment of the shock (Table 1.2). Estimates conrm the
preceding intuition: recovery times are signicant for those systems in which
there is on average a lower volume of unallocated capital. In particular,
an economy hit by a bank run during a period of elevated production and
large uninvested resources requires a shorter time to recover. Clearly, this
result does not hold for those systems in which there is always a high level of
unallocated funds. To conrm this nding, we analyze also the recovery time
for the GBR and, as expected, the estimations produce completely dierent
results (Table 1.3).
Lastly, recovery times in the GBR and in the TBR are nearer in the
moments of high production (Fig. 1.20). This nding is clearly in line with
the preceding analysis of the shock: the dampening of the bank run is strictly
connected to the overall level of unallocated capital of the system. In other
words, it is the destruction of the credit lines which amplies the shock:
an economy in which the overall nancial system can easier substitute a
defaulted intermediary suers minor losses.
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1.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a simple agent-based model of bank-intermediated
credit ows in which information imperfections give rise to search frictions
and resource misallocation. We have shown that credit and business cycles
arise endogenously and co-evolve. The key driving mechanism is a pure com-
petition eect, as banks struggle to manage their net interest margin through
the activation and termination of loan relationships at varying interest rates
in order to attract deposits. By assuming the possibility that banks can be
aected by funding runs, we have also studied the macroeconomic impact of
nancial crisis in terms of output losses and speed of recovery.
The model can be extended in a number of directions to consider impor-
tant issues. First, we have so far ignored agency frictions. The probability a
long-run loan contract is severed  and, therefore, the extent of credit reallo-
cation - is in general related to the eort choice of the borrower in servicing
his debt, as well as on the risk appetite of the lender. Incorporating moral
hazard problems associated to the level of net worth of agents are therefore
likely to sensibly improve the explanatory capability of our model.
For reasons of tractability we have abstracted from the labor market or
any other kind of physical production factors. As shown e.g. in Wasmer
and Weil (2004), general equilibrium feedbacks between the markets for -
nance and productive inputs can magnify the response of the economy to
exogenous shocks through a nancial accelerator mechanism. Such an im-
provement could allow us to complement the story we oer here with an
analysis of the way disruptions in nancial markets aect unemployment
and economic activity, and vice-versa, by exploring the issues of how credit
misallocation interacts with labor misallocation (Delli Gatti et al., 2012) and
income distribution (Dosi et al., 2013).
Finally, an interesting extension would be that of studying the role of the
central bank in smoothing the credit cycle and responding to liquidity crisis
by acting as a lender-of-last-resort.
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1.6 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Firm Value
Time t = 0 t = 1 t = 2, . . . ,∞
Cash ow Pold + x− x Pnew − (1 +R)x Pnew
Firm value V0 = Pold +
Pnew
R0





V2 = (1 +R2)
Pnew
R2
Note: the rm starts a new credit relation at time t = 0 and considers the current
interest rate (Rt) as xed and constant through time. Because of bounded rationality, the
entrepreneur does not take account of the probability of future rescissions of the contract.
Figure 1.1: Flow of Funds and Agents Behavior
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Table 1.2: OLS Estimates of Targeted Bank Run Data
Model: OLS (N = 450)
Dependent variable: log(Recovery Time)
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
Constant log(Production)
Model Coecient p-value Coecient p-value
{γ = 0.35 ∧ θ = 0.35} 20.9843 5.99e−042 −2.1086 4.19e−027
{γ = 0.35 ∧ θ = 0.70} 7.6039 8.27e−05 −0.3370 0.2141
{γ = 0.70 ∧ θ = 0.35} 7.4394 0.0282 −0.1910 0.6636
{γ = 0.70 ∧ θ = 0.70} 5.3039 0.0032 −0.0341 0.9018
Table 1.3: OLS Estimates of General Bank Run Data
Model: OLS (N = 450)
Dependent variable: log(Recovery Time)
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
Constant log(Production)
Model Coecient p-value Coecient p-value
{γ = 0.35 ∧ θ = 0.35} 6.3622 0.0007 −0.3440 0.1616
{γ = 0.35 ∧ θ = 0.70} −3.7082 0.3988 1.0289 0.0974
{γ = 0.70 ∧ θ = 0.35} −6.8509 0.0844 1.4142 0.0063
{γ = 0.70 ∧ θ = 0.70} −5.3046 0.1206 1.2968 0.0142
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Figure 1.4: Expected Value of Aggregate Production
Figure 1.5: Average Number of Active Intermediaries
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Figure 1.6: Expected Value of Production over Standard Deviation
Figure 1.7: Expected Value of Unallocated Capital over Total Capital
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Figure 1.8: Expected Value of Excess Prots: E [P ]− θ − xE[R]
Figure 1.9: Production Cycle
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Figure 1.10: Average Interest Rates of the Intermediaries
Figure 1.11: Average Interest Rates on Loans and Firms Productivity
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Figure 1.12: Average Contractual Prot
Figure 1.13: Average Unallocated Capital over Total Capital
30
Figure 1.14: Intermediaries Behavior: Ratio over Total Active
Intermediaries (Baxter-King Filter)
Figure 1.15: Firms Behavior: Ratio over Total Active Firms
(Baxter-King Filter)
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Figure 1.16: Impulse Response Function: Percentage Deviation from the
Baseline Simulation {γ = 0.35 ∧ θ = 0.35}
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Figure 1.17: Impulse Response Function: Percentage Deviation from the
Baseline Simulation {γ = 0.35 ∧ θ = 0.7}
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Figure 1.18: Impulse Response Function: Percentage Deviation from the
Baseline Simulation {γ = 0.7 ∧ θ = 0.35}
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Figure 1.19: Impulse Response Function: Percentage Deviation from the
Baseline Simulation {γ = 0.7 ∧ θ = 0.7}
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The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was the tipping point of
the nancial crisis that had begun in the year before. Indeed, the refusal
of the private sector to fund the unsustainable portfolio of this institution
showed the extent of this event in all its dimension. Consequently, the re-
sponse of the policymaker was to implement a comprehensive monetary and
scal plan to save distressed intermediaries, recover the functionality of the
nancial sector and contain the subsequent recession.
The most peculiar characteristic of this event was its vast and uncon-
trollable diusion throughout the nancial sector. Indeed, the spread of the
crisis through the complex network of interbank lending and borrowing rela-
tions led to a complete meltdown of the market. As a result, researchers have
tried to understand the underlying mechanism of contagion and the reasons
behind its amplication.
The role of market connectivity in the diusion of idiosyncratic shocks
is not a relatively new topic. Indeed, the seminal works of Allen and Gale
(2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) showed how the structure of interbank claims
can aect the stability of the system. However, the crisis led to the develop-
ment of a new line of research which relies on network theory to investigate
the propagation of shocks in the interbank market. Accordingly, scholars fo-
cused on the mechanism of nancial contagion in dierent network topology
both from a theoretical (Battiston et al., 2012b,a; Gai and Kapadia, 2010;
Acemoglu et al., 2015) and an empirical point of view (see Upper (2011) for
a review). Overall, these researches found a trade-o between idiosyncratic
and systemic risk. Indeed, while a highly connected nancial sector can eas-
ily compensate small shocks in single intermediaries, it is fully exposed to
large events and bankruptcies cascades.
With regards to macroeconomic models, scholars studied the propagation
of crises in the nancial sector and their eects in the real economy in two
main directions. Indeed, most of the research in this eld analyzed the role
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of the nancial accelerator (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) in the amplica-
tion of idiosyncratic shocks in dierent topologies of the interbank network
(Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Tedeschi et al., 2012; Riccetti et al., 2013; Grilli
et al., 2014, 2015). Conversely, the remaining part of the authors focused
on the eects of exogenous reductions in the intermediaries' liquidity on
bankruptcies cascades (Iori et al., 2006; Lenzu and Tedeschi, 2012; Berardi
and Tedeschi, 2017). Overall, these models studied how exogenous shocks
in the productivity of the single investment or in the allocation of wealth
can aect the aggregate dynamic of the economy. Specically, individual
defaults or fund reallocations can cause economy-wide changes through the
amplication mechanisms of the nancial accelerator and of bankruptcies
cascades.
In this article, we follow the latter line of research. Indeed, the main
aim of this work is to study how dierent network topologies of the inter-
bank market can aect the (re)allocation of funds in the economy and their
eects on the overall performance of the system. Specically, we develop a
macroeconomic agent-based model (ABM) in which movements in the asset
and liability sides of banks' balance sheets are the result of a decentralized
matching mechanism. In particular, we model the endogenous formation of
deposit, credit and interbank relations through the preferential attachment
mechanism developed by Bianconi and Barabási (2001). Indeed, agents move
from their current nancial institution to a new one on the basis of their t-
ness (see Delli Gatti et al. (2010); Riccetti et al. (2013); Lenzu and Tedeschi
(2012) for dierent applications). In other words, households, rms and
banks react to reductions in the attractiveness of their existing counterparty
by switching to a new one. As a result, the dynamic of cycles and the topol-
ogy of deposit, credit and interbank networks evolves endogenously.
Accordingly, our article extends the existing literature on macroeconomic
and credit networks in two main directions. First, introducing households
as active agents, we build a complete economic environment in which the
response of depositors to changes in the overall state of the system plays a
major role in the denition of nal outcomes. Indeed, the existing litera-
ture on credit networks relegates the role of these agents to passive shock
absorbers. However, it is clear that the end users of the nancial sector are
the households themselves. Consequently, our work lls this gap in the the-
oretical study of macroeconomic networks. Second, because of the extension
of the preferential attachment mechanism also to depositors, we can obtain
endogenous liquidity shocks. In other words, we do not need to assume a
predened mechanism of crisis formation because this event emerges as an
intrinsic property of our model.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we dene the model.
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In Section 2.3 we study the dynamic of cycles and the long run properties
of the simulated economy for dierent network topologies. In Section 2.4 we
calibrate our results on the empirical moments of United States data and we
investigate the distributional characteristics of the system on the basis of the
empirical results of previous researches. Lastly, Section 2.5 concludes and
states some directions for future research.
2.2 Sequence of Events
The economy is composed of a xed number of households (h = 1, . . . , nh),
intermediaries (i = 1, . . . , ni) and rms (f = 1, . . . , nf ). Households are the
owners of nancial capital, which we assume for simplicity as the only factor
of production, while rms have no resources of their own and must raise
funds in the credit market to start production.
Families deposit their wealth in only one intermediary at a time as de-
mand deposits and cannot establish direct connections with producing rms.
Here we are implicitly assuming that investment evaluation and ex-post ver-
ication are costly and intermediaries are more ecient than households in
performing these tasks. In addition, we assume that the nancial sector can
supply credit without sustaining any additional eort or expense. On the
other hand, households can always search a new counterparty and can move
their wealth from an intermediary to another one without any constraint.
Accordingly, we assume that at the beginning of every period families search
and select the nancial institutions which pay the highest interest rate.
The main source of income of intermediaries derives from the credit issued
to enterprises. Specically, as in Den Haan et al. (2003), nancial institutions






where (·)α is a production function with decreasing marginal returns, ki,f
the external nance supplied by the i-th intermediary to the f-th rm and
Pi,t−1 the prot left by the i-th bank to its borrowers at time t. Notice that
the latter measures both the protability (Pi,t−1) and the cost of nancing
(dri,f,t/dPi,t−1 < 0) of the enterprise. Accordingly, entrepreneurs will search
and select the banks paying the highest contractual prot.
We assume that intermediaries set their contractual prots (Pi,t−1) be-
fore the start of production and update them every period taking into ac-
count both their demand for credit and the supply of deposits. Conversely,
the size of each loan (ki,f ) is dened at the beginning of the open-ended
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credit relation and is not modied through time. Specically, intermediaries
extract at random the value of new issuances from a predened distribu-
tion. Indeed, the idea is to model the implicit informational capital of banks
through this mechanism (Stiglitz, 2015b). In fact, we assume that nancial
institutions do not know the optimal size of loans. However, when they need
additional money to repay their depositors, they reduce their assets starting
from sub-optimal investments. Consequently, the eciency of the intermedi-
aries' portfolio increases over time because of this asymmetric mechanism of
credit allocation9.
As stated before, households observe the interest rate paid by nancial
institutions and move their wealth to the best-preforming intermediaries at
the beginning of every period. Consequently, when banks experience an ex-
cessive withdrawal of funds, they must reduce lending to repay depositors10.
Financial institutions in that situation can avoid part of the process of credit
liquidation by entering the interbank market. Specically, illiquid banks can
nance their decit by borrowing from another intermediary at the required
return, conditional to the availability of resources in the selected counter-
party.
Lastly, after the allocation of funds in the interbank market, intermedi-
aries supply credit and rms search and choose the banks oering the most
attractive nancing opportunities. As a result, if the enterprise has an ex-
isting credit line, the loan is closed and the capital returned to the original
nancial institution.
2.2.1 Model Initialization
At the beginning of the simulation families have an homogeneous quantity
of capital dh,0 = K0 (∀h = 1, . . . , nh) which they deposit in a bank selected
at random. We dene the subset of households connected with the i-th
intermediary at the end of time t as Hi,t. Hence, at the time t = 0 we have:
Pr(h ∈ Hi,0) = U(1, ni), where U(·) is an uniform distribution.
Intermediaries set their initial contractual prot equal to the optimal dis-
tribution of incomes11, namely Pi,0 = (1−α)(K0)α, x a minimum investment
dimension k̄i,0, evaluate the resources available for investments and generate
9In other words, new issuances can return both high and low interest rates, while the
loans held in the portfolio are only the most protable ones.
10We assume for the sake of simplicity that intermediaries calculate their nancial needs
on the basis of the net ow of capital. In other words, banks estimate their decits after
the complete reallocation of wealth by the households.
11The details of the optimal distribution of incomes and of the representative agent
growth path are discussed in section 2.3 (Eq. 2.37 and 2.38).
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the new credit supply schedule.
The minimum investment dimension is the lowest value of capital which
produces a non-negative interest rate: k̄i,t = { k | (k)α − Pi,t = 0}. We
set this constraint to avoid negative returns on new loans, which increase
excessively the volatility of simulations and, because of that, occasionally
produce degenerate equilibria in which only one intermediary remains in the
market. However, from a theoretical point of view, this assumption allows
us to dene deposits as truly risk-free, in the sense that the capital quota is
always repaid in the short term.
As stated before, the credit supply of every intermediary is computed
according to a stochastic allocation process. The quantity of available re-







while the size of new loans is extracted from the distribution:






is satised, where FNi is the set of new loans supplied by the i-th intermediary.
Lastly, rms demand funds. Given that all the intermediaries oer the
same contractual prot at the beginning of the simulation, we allocate the
credit across entrepreneurs at random. In other words, we extract the com-
position of the initial credit relations with probabilities: Pr(f ∈ Fi,0) =
U(1, ni) · U(1, nf ), where Fi,t is the set of rms connected with the i-th in-
termediary at the end of time t.
2.2.2 Production and Interest Rates
Given the set of credit relations inherited from the previous period:
{Pi,t−1; ki,f} with f ∈ Fi,t−1 ∀ i = 1, . . . , ni (2.4)
rms start production, retain prots and pay to their corresponding bank
the interests on their loans, as dened in equation (2.1). On the other hand,




ri,f,t · ki,f (2.5)
and dene the new temporary set of credit links: Fi,t = Fi,t−1.
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In the previous section, we introduce the possibility for intermediaries in
nancial distress to borrow in the interbank market to remedy the lack of
funding12. Given that these loans pay a positive interest rate, they can have
a considerable inuence on the protability of banks. We assume for the
moment that there is an existing set of interbank relations:
{ri,j; ki,j} with j ∈ Ii,t−1 ∀ i = 1, . . . , ni (2.6)
where Ii,t−1 is the set of intermediaries connected to the i-th bank at the end
of time t−1, ri,j the interest rate received (paid) and ki,j the sum lent by the
i-th nancial institution (borrowed by the j-th bank, if negative). Therefore,





ri,j · ki,j (2.7)
Subsequently, under the assumption of an overnight interbank market,
intermediaries return to their counterparties the capital borrowed in the pre-
vious period. Accordingly, the new set interbank links becomes:
{ri,j = 0; ki,j = 0} with j ∈ Ii,t ∀ i = 1, . . . , ni (2.8)
with Ii,t = Ii,t−1.









h∈Hi,t−1 dh,t−1 are the aggregate deposits of the i-th bank,
such that:
{dh,t−1} with h ∈ Hi,t ∀ i = 1, . . . , ni (2.10)
where Hi,t = Hi,t−1 is the new temporary set of deposit links.
2.2.3 Deposit Market
At the beginning of each period families observe the interest rate paid by
their corresponding intermediary, namely rh,t = ri,t with h ∈ Hi,t (see Eq.








12We provide the details of the interbank borrowing/lending mechanism in the next
section.
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s.t. dh,t+s + ch,t+s = (1 + rh,t+s)dh,t+s−1 (2.12)
where ch,t+s and dh,t+s are the consumption and savings of the h-th household
at time t + s. In addition, to calibrate the model on real data, we assume
that the length of one year is equal to Ty periods. Accordingly, we set the
one period discount factor equal to β1/Ty .13
The optimal solution to the problem is given by the conditions:
ch,t = (1− β1/Ty)(1 + rh,t)dh,t−1 (2.13)
dh,t = β
1/Ty(1 + rh,t)dh,t−1 (2.14)
Subsequently, households search at random another intermediary and





for z = 1, . . . , ni. In other words, the set of deposit relations between banks
and households changes according to the rule:
{dh,t} with
{
h /∈ Hold,t ∧ h ∈ Hnew,t if ηnew ≥ ηold
h ∈ Hold,t otherwise
(2.16)
2.2.4 Intermediaries Behavior and Interbank Market
After the reallocation of wealth by the households, intermediaries modify
their contractual prots, evaluate liquidity, enter the interbank market and
supply credit.
Banks react to movements in the market modifying their contractual prof-
its. In particular, they follow the rule:
Pi,t =
{
Pi,t−1 if Di,t ≥ Di,t−1
[1 + γ · 1 · U(0, 1)] · Pi,t−1 otherwise
with 1 =
{













is the amount of unallocated capital at the end of the previous period. More-
over, Di,t−1 =
∑
h∈Hi,t−1 dh,t−1 and Ai,t−1 =
∑
f∈Fi,t−1 ki,f are the past aggre-
gate deposits and credits to rms, while
∑
j∈Ii,t−1 ki,j is the net interbank
position of the i-th bank.
When an intermediary observes an increase in the total amount of deposits
(Di,t ≥ Di,t−1), it keeps the contractual prot at the level of the previous
period. In fact, it recognizes that its interest rate is higher than the rest
of the economy and that it is optimal to not modify the conditions which
ensured the achievement of that result.
Conversely, when banks experience a withdrawal of deposits, they must
understand the reasons behind the sub-optimal interest rate paid to their
investors. The main driver of this decision is the amount of unallocated cap-
ital accrued in the preceding period. Indeed, due to the minimum investment
dimension (k̄i,t−1), it is always optimal for the single intermediary to invest
all the available resources to obtain a non-negative interest rate. Hence, an
excess of uninvested funds  dened here as a positive dierence between
the overall quantity of cash reserves and the minimum investment dimen-
sion (Ci,t−1 ≥ k̄i,t−1)  indicates that the bank it is not oering a suciently
competitive contractual prot to the rms. In the opposite situation, the
intermediary recognizes that it is leaving an excessively high quota of pro-
duction to the entrepreneurs and that it is obtaining a sub-optimal return
from its investments.
Subsequently, given the new contractual prot Pi,t, banks compute the
new minimum investment dimension k̄i,t, update the expected future return
of their credits:
E[ri,f,t+1] = [(ki,f )
α − Pi,t] /ki,f (2.19)
with f ∈ Fi,t and evaluate their liquidity :
Li,t = Di,t − Ai,t−1 (2.20)
where (Di,t) is the current level of deposits and (Ai,t−1) the portfolio of credits
inherited from the preceding period. Indeed, this process is necessary for the
intermediaries to assess their nancial needs and, in case of liquidity shortage,
which loans bear the minimum opportunity cost of closure. Specically, with
the term liquidity (Li,t) we indicate the amount of unallocated resources
available for lending in each bank at the beginning of every period. As stated
before, we assume that investments in the interbank market last only one
period and are repaid together with their interest rates. Therefore, liquidity
is simply given by the dierence between the current level of deposits and
the portfolio of credits inherited from the preceding period.
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Notice that the equations of liquidity (2.20) and unallocated capital (2.18)
seem to represent the same economic dimension. However, by rewriting them
in terms of their past values, we obtain:
Li,t = Di,t −Di,t−1 + Ci,t−1 (2.21)
Ui,t = At−1 − At + Li,t (2.22)
where we removed for simplicity the interbank market.
The new versions of the two equations put under the light the main
drivers of the underlying economic dynamic. Specically, with regards to the
unallocated capital (Ui,t), it emerges that, given the current level of liquid-
ity, entrepreneurs' movements between intermediaries determine the overall
amount of uninvested funds left in banks (Fi,t−1 → Fi,t). Conversely, the
resources available for supplying new credit (Li,t) are the result of the house-
holds' investment decisions (Hi,t−1 → Hi,t). In other words, the movements
in the level of unallocated capital (Ui,t) capture the changes in the asset side
of the intermediaries' balance sheets, while the adjustments in the liquidity
(Li,t) provide a proxy for the evolution of banks' liabilities.
Interbank Market
As stated before, when intermediaries experience an excessive withdrawal
of funds, namely when Li,t < 0, they must reduce lending to repay their
depositors or they can try to meet their nancial needs by borrowing in the
interbank market. On the contrary, banks with positive resources (Li,t ≥ 0)
must decide whether to lend them to other nancial institutions or supply
credit to rms.
To being with, intermediaries compute their reserve/ask interest rate:
rIi,t =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∞ if Li,t ≤ 0

















is the expected return of lending the amount Li,t to rms. In other words,
E[rpt+1|Li,t; k̄i,t] is the opportunity cost of investing Li,t in the interbank mar-
ket rather than in credit to enterprises. Accordingly, banks with positive
resources will accept any request of borrowing in the interbank market at
the required interest rate E[rpt+1|Li,t; k̄i,t] up to the amount Li,t.
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Conversely, when the liquidity of the nancial institution is positive but
lower than the minimum investment dimension k̄i,t, it is not sucient to sup-
ply credit to rms. Accordingly, the intermediary demand only a minimum
interest rate14.
Lastly, when the bank has no resources to invest in the interbank market
or is in liquidity distress, it requires an innite interest rate to supply credit.
In other words, the nancial institution demands an innite reserve price
to obtain a positive return from investing a null quantity of capital in the
interbank market.
Subsequently, nancial distressed intermediaries observe the expected in-
terest rate of each investment (E[ri,f,t+1]) and evaluate the opportunity of
closing the credit contracts with the lowest returns, until the condition:∑
f∈F defi,t
ki,f + Li,t ≥ 0 (2.25)
is satised, where F defi,t ⊆ Fi,t is the smallest subset of investments with
minimum protability respecting this constraint15.
Lastly, banks in liquidity distress (Li,t ≤ 0) enter in sequence the inter-
bank market16, evaluate the benet of borrowing from a new intermediary
and calculate the optimal size of the loan:
1. The intermediary in decit looks for a new counterparty in the inter-
bank market and moves to the new location if the latter has a higher
t, where:







is the t of the i-th bank, for z = 1, . . . , ni. Accordingly, interbank
links become:
i /∈ Iold,t ∧ i ∈ Inew,t
old /∈ Ii,t ∧ new ∈ Ii,t
}
if ηnew ≥ ηold
i ∈ Iold,t ∧ old ∈ Ii,t otherwise
(2.27)
Notice that, as in Berardi and Tedeschi (2017), banks select their coun-
terparties in the interbank market on the basis of their ask interest rate
(rIi,t) and size (Di,t). Indeed, the largest nancial institutions may have
14ε = 2.22× 10−16 is the machine epsilon.
15In other words, E[ri,f,t+1] ≥ E[ri,fdef ,t+1] ∀ f ∈ {Fi,t \ F
def
i,t } ∧ fdef ∈ F
def
i,t
16The order of entrance is extracted at random.
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at their disposition more resources to lend but can ask a higher return.
Therefore, we model this trade-o by changing the weight ω of the
intermediaries' t.
2. To maximize its future protability, the bank chooses to nance the
credits whose expected returns are higher than the interest rate re-
quired by its counterparty. In addition, the total amount demanded
must be lower than the quantity supplied by the other nancial insti-
tution. Specically, whenever a bank borrows from an intermediary,
the available resources of the latter decrease. Consequently, the inter-
mediaries entering the interbank rst nd more capital to support their
nancial needs.
The bank evaluates the potential liquidity it would obtain if it had not




ki,f + Li,t (2.28)
and chooses to nance that part of its portfolio of credits in decit
F fini,t ⊆ F
def
i,t respecting the conditions:








ki,f ≤ LTi,t + LS,t
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (2.29)
where LS,t and r
I
S,t are the liquidity and the interest rate of the inter-
mediary selected (S) in the interbank market17.
3. The amount nanced, the interest rate and the interbank links are thus








⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ with i ∈ IS,t
(2.30)
17We adopt this notation because the selected intermediary can be both the old or the
new one.
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4. Lastly, the liquidity constrained bank closes the credit lines which are
not nanced through the interbank market:{




f ̸∈ F fini,t
}
⇒ {f ̸∈ Fi,t} ∧ {ki,f = 0}
and both the intermediaries update their available resources:
LS,t = LS,t − kS,i




After this process of interbank nancing and credit closure, intermediaries
observe the quantity of resources available for investment (Li,t) and generate
their new credit supply schedule as in the initialization phase of the system
(see Eq. 2.2 and 2.3 with available resources equal to Li,t instead of Di,0).
2.2.5 Credit market
Given the supply of loans, rms search at random a new counterparty and





and a new credit relation starts:{




with f ∈ Fnew,t if {ηnew ≥ ηold|credit supply} (2.32)
where kNj ∈ FNnew is the size of a new loan supplied by the new intermediary.
Consequently, the preexisting credit line is closed:
{f /∈ Fold,t} ∧ {kold,f = 0} (2.33)
Notice that not all rms are connected with an intermediary and have an
active credit line. In that situation we assume that: ηold = ηnot connected = 0.
In addition, entrepreneurs can move to a new nancial institution conditional
to an eective supply of credit. Therefore, the rm can switch to the new
location only in this case.
Lastly, when the credit supply is completely depleted or there is no more
demand for new loans, intermediaries evaluate the nal amount of unallo-
cated resources/cash reserves:





2.3 Network Topology, Steady State and Cy-
cles
In the previous section we describe the mechanism behind the formation of
borrowing and lending relations. These links can be easily interpreted as the
building blocks of a nancial network. Indeed, agents (households, banks and
rms) are the nodes of a directed graph in which the weights of the edges are
equal to the size of the deposit, interbank and credit relations. Accordingly,
the direction of the links goes from borrowers to lenders.
In this section we examine the characteristics of the system for dierent
values of the parameter governing the behavior of banks (ω). Specically, we
study two extreme cases in which nancial institutions select their counter-
parties in the interbank market only on the basis of their size (ω = 1) and
interest rate (ω = 0). Furthermore, we examine an intermediate situation,
namely a mid-point between these two frameworks (ω = 0.6).
We perform this analysis in two main directions. First, we study the
topology of the network for individual simulations. Indeed, even if dierent
replications of the model produce dissimilar results, the main properties of
the network remain the same. Second, we analyze both the characteristics
of cycles and the long-run steady-state of the economy on the basis of 200
simulations. Indeed, we can study the empirical moments of each variable
through this method and we can compare the dierent frameworks in detail.
Lastly, notice that in the previous section we introduce the length of the
year Ty as a parameter of the model. Here we perform the analysis on the
data transformed in a quarterly basis. Specically, we collect every time







The set of parameters employed in the simulations, the calibration of the
model and the micro properties of the system are then discussed in the next
section.
2.3.1 Network Topology
In the previous section we introduce the possibility of dierent network
topologies to emerge depending on the behavior of banks. Specically, we
assume that intermediaries can select their counterparties in the interbank
market according to their interest rate and size. In fact, the largest banks
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may have more resources to lend but can demand a higher return. For this
reason, a trade-o can exist between the amount nanced and the required
interest rate. As a result, intermediaries' behavior can aect the topology
of the deposit, interbank and credit networks. In particular, the system can
converge to a highly centralized network for two main reasons.
First, when intermediaries borrow in the interbank market they bear an
additional risk: while the credit line between two banks is xed, the under-
lying assets are not. Indeed, nancial institutions must always pay interests
on the debt contracted in the interbank market. On the contrary, rms are
free to move to other banks and can close the existing loan. In that situa-
tion, intermediaries must pay a xed interest rate on their interbank loans
even if they are receiving a reduced income stream from their credit issued to
entrepreneurs. In other words, borrowers in the interbank market can suer
additional losses because the real activities underlying the interbank credit
may not cover it anymore.
Second, when banks select their counterparties on the basis of their size,
by construction, they do so regardless of the ask interest rate. Consequently,
when the return required by the hub increases, intermediaries in decit can
nance a smaller share of their portfolio and must liquidate a larger quota
of their credits. For this reason, also optimal investments, which could have
been founded by other banks, are closed and the productivity of liquidity
constrained institutions decreases.
Summing up, these two eects can generate a competitive advantage for
lenders in the interbank market. In particular, only the hub can exploit these
mechanisms in a highly centralized context and can pay, on average, a higher
return to its investors. In this way, it can attract more households and can
reinforce its position in all three markets (deposit, interbank and, because of
the large availability of funds, credit market).
A visual inspection of the graphs representing the two extreme cases
conrms this idea. When intermediaries select their counterparties in the
interbank market on the basis of their relative size (ω = 1), the system
converges to a highly centralized network (Fig. 2.1). Indeed, most of the
households deposits in the hub and also a large part of the rm borrows
from it. Moreover, all the transactions carried in the interbank market ow
through the largest bank. On the contrary, intermediaries are almost equal
in the decentralized context (ω = 0), without a clear hub emerging in the
market (Fig. 2.2).
The time series representing the ID of the hub18 and its degree conrm
18Each bank has an unique identier from 1 to ni. The ID is equal to the normalized
identier between 1/ni to 1.
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these results. When intermediaries select their counterparties in the inter-
bank market on the basis of their relative size (ω = 1), the system converges
to a highly centralized network. As a consequence, nearly one third of the
resources ows through a single nancial institution in all three markets and
the hub remains the same throughout the simulation (Fig. 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5).
On the contrary, when the interest rate is the key determinant of inter-
mediaries' decisions (ω = 0), no hub emerges in the market (Fig. 2.6, 2.7
and 2.8). Indeed, by searching the nancial institutions asking the lowest
interest rates, banks in decit can achieve a higher margin of intermedia-
tion19. As a result, these extra prots more than compensate for the risk
of idiosyncratic credit closures by rms. Overall, banks in nancial distress
exploit the interbank market in this context and pay, on average, a higher
return to its investors. The result is then a continuous reallocation of wealth
by the households.
Lastly, the hub emerges only for a limited time in the intermediate sit-
uation (ω = 0.6) (Fig. 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11). In fact, as in the centralized
framework, the largest bank can exploit other intermediaries because of its
size and can reinforce its market position. However, when it starts demand-
ing an excessively high interest rate, the rest of the system stop borrowing
from it. Therefore, the hub loses the additional prots coming from the inter-
bank market and pays a lower return to its depositors. Overall, households
start to withdraw their resources and the bank loses its privileged state.
Finally, with regards to the correlation coecient between the degree of
the hub and its t, this value is always positive (see boxes from Fig. 2.3 to
Fig. 2.11). Furthermore, the strength of the relationship in the deposit and
interbank markets is always higher than in the credit sector. Indeed, the
availability of funds in banks determines the issuance of new loans to rms.
Consequently, the deposit and interbank networks dominate the credit one.
Nevertheless, the correlation coecient of the interbank market is close to
zero in the centralized framework (see Fig. 2.5). Indeed, the t of the hub
is constant and equal to its maximum value in that context, while its degree
uctuates according to the availability of funds and the market demand. As
a result, the correlation coecient is equal to zero.
2.3.2 Credit Cycles
Cycles show dierent dynamics in three network topologies. In particular,
aggregate uctuations in the centralized framework are more persistent (Fig.
19Indeed, the dierence between the interest rate obtained from credit to rms and the
return paid to intermediaries increases.
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2.12) and exhibit a larger amplitude (Fig. 2.13).
To begin with, the three network topologies follow a similar pattern in
the allocation of funds during dierent phases of the cycle (see Fig. 2.14,
2.15 and 2.16). In fact, an exogenous increase in the aggregate production
produces a subsequent rise in the centrality of the deposit and credit markets
in all the specications of the model. Hence, positive shocks are mainly due
to a better allocation of funds by the single institution. Indeed, only a
more ecient bank can attract a larger number of households and lend the
additional resources to a broader number of rms. Accordingly, also the
interest rates in the deposit and interbank markets increase, thus leading to
the observed reduction in the centrality of the latter. Nevertheless, the size
of this reallocation of funds is larger and more persistent in the centralized
network. Similarly, the interbank market has a statistically positive eect
on future production only in this framework20. Indeed, all banks rely on the
single hub to nance their decits in this context. For this reason, the state
of the economy highly depends on the overall eciency of the core bank and
vice-versa.
To conrm these results, we estimate a vector autoregressive model of
order one for all the network topologies and we simulate the impulse response
functions of a positive shock in the aggregate production and an exogenous
reduction in the volume of the interbank market21.
With regards to the positive shock in the aggregate production, this pro-
duces a reallocation of funds and credits from the periphery to the hub (Fig.
2.17, 2.18 and 2.19). This conrms the idea of a temporary rise in the pro-
ductivity of a single intermediary. Accordingly, also interest rates hike in
both the deposit and interbank market in the short-run. However, this posi-
tive shock, raising the quantity of resources available in the system, increases
the amount of unallocated capital as well. Consequently, the average con-
tractual prot starts growing in the medium term, reducing the interest rates
and moving the economy back to the long-run equilibrium.
This dynamic is particularly pronounced in the centralized model, with
a large reallocation of funds from the periphery to the hub in the short-
run, followed by a small reversal during the medium-term transition phase.
20Also the interbank market in the intermediate context follows this pattern, but it is
not statistically signicant.
21The time series included in the estimations are: aggregate production, interest rate of
deposits, volume of deposits in the hub and in the periphery, average contractual prot,
interbank volume and interest rate, liquidity, volume of credit in the hub and in the periph-
ery, unallocated capital. Lag selection is based on the Akaike (AIC), Schwarz Bayesian
(BIC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQC) information criterions. The orthogonal errors of the
impulse response function follow the actual order of the model.
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The cause is the dierent response of the interbank market in the three
specications. Even if the interbank interest rate rises in all the network
topologies, this movement is larger in the centralized framework. Indeed, in
this context, banks choose to nance their decits only from the hub, which
requires a higher return because of its increased eciency. Consequently,
the volume and the degree centrality of the interbank market decrease and
the intermediaries of the periphery close a larger number of credit lines.
As a result, the implicit loss of informational capital, reducing the overall
productivity of the periphery, cause a vaster reallocation of funds toward the
core bank.
Conversely, when banks nance their decit on the basis of the interest
rate, the increase in the interbank market returns is lower. Indeed, the
intermediaries can switch to those institutions which oer a better price,
thus reducing the degree centrality of the interbank market. In addition,
the increased eciency of the system provides a vaster quantity of resources.
Hence, the overall eect is a rise in the interbank market volume.
These results are conrmed by the impulse response function of an ex-
ogenous reduction in the volume of the interbank market (Fig. 2.20, 2.21
and 2.22). Indeed, in the centralized specication, the hub is not able to
compensate the contraction of optimal investments in the periphery. Indeed,
new loans issuances from the core bank are not as ecient as the seized
ones. For this reason, the interest rate of the hub decreases and it suers a
sudden withdrawal of resources. In addition, the interbank market cannot
counterbalance this outow of funds because of the dimension of the largest
bank. Indeed, the single intermediary of the periphery is too small to pro-
vide enough resources to the core bank. Consequently, also the hub must
close a large portion of its portfolio, including optimal investments as well.
Therefore, the outcome is a temporary recession.
In the view of that, is not surprising that a negative shock in the interbank
market has no eects in the decentralized and intermediate frameworks. In
fact, there are no banks which benet more from this mechanism in these
contexts. Consequently, new loans issuances can easily compensate the seized
ones. In addition, even if new credits were not as protable as the old ones,
the rest of the market would be able to counterbalance the subsequent outow
of funds in the hub. This conrms the idea that a large part of the recession
in the centralized specication is due to the inability of the periphery to
nance the decit of the hub. In fact, the asymmetric properties of the
network would require a perfect coordination between the intermediaries in
the rest of the market to nance the core bank.
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2.3.3 Steady State
In this section we study the long term properties of aggregate production for
the three network topologies. In addition, we compare our results with the
neoclassical solution of the model and a benchmark situation without the
interbank market.
To obtain the neoclassical optimal growth path, we assume a perfectly
competitive environment in which all the entrepreneurs maximize their prof-




α − rtkf,t ⇒ rt = α(kf,t)α−1 (2.36)
Subsequently, by assuming a one-to-one relation between rms and house-
holds (kf,t = dh,t = kt) and by substituting (2.36) into (2.14), we obtain the
optimal growth path:
kt+1 = β(1 + rt)kt = β (α(kt)
α + kt) (2.37)
and the equilibrium contractual prots:
Pt = (1− α)(kt)α (2.38)
On the one hand, all the specications of the model converge to a pseudo
steady-state level in the long term (Fig. 2.23). This outcome is a direct
consequence of the capital accumulation rule of the households (Eq. 2.14),
combined with the decreasing marginal returns of the production function.
Indeed, an excess of capital, reducing the interest rate paid to depositors,
decreases their incentive to save and vice-versa. As a result, the system con-
verges to a long term steady-state level. In addition, aggregate production in
the neoclassical solution outperforms the results obtained in our agent-based
setting. Indeed, the mechanism of decentralized matching, through the con-
tinuous creation and destruction of deposit and credit relations, maintains
the system below the optimal allocation of wealth. Nevertheless, this out-
come is line with the existing literature on search and matching models for
the credit market (Den Haan et al., 2003; Wasmer and Weil, 2004; Becsi
et al., 2013) and fully conrms their results.
On the other hand, the interbank market has a positive eect on the long
run aggregate production (Fig. 2.23). Indeed, when intermediaries suer
a withdrawal of deposits, they can nance the most protable investments
through this market. Consequently, the implicit loss of informational capital
decreases and the overall productivity of the economy rises. For this reason,
banks can provide funds to a vaster number of rms, thus leading to an
additional increase in the aggregate production.
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Lastly, all the three specication of the model achieve a similar level
of production in the long term. However, their distributional properties
are quite dierent (Fig. 2.24). Firstly, the centralized and intermediate
frameworks seem to have similar moments, with the exception of the mean.
Indeed, the continuous formation and destruction of dierent hubs in the
intermediate case does not allow them to reach a critical mass. As a result,
cycles follow a similar dynamic in these two contexts (see the duration and
depth of expansions and recessions in Fig. 2.12 and 2.13). However, the large
number of credit closures by the hub during recessions produces a large loss of
informational capital, with a consequent reduction in the overall productivity
of the system (see, for example, the evolution of the degree of the hub in Fig.
2.10). Conversely, aggregate production in the centralized framework ranges
between the two extremes of the previous distributions. Consequently, the
centralized framework outperforms the intermediate context on average, but
at the cost of a higher volatility (see Fig. 2.12 and 2.13). Indeed, even if
the loss of informational capital is lower during recessions, the state of the
economy is highly dependent on the performance of the hub and vice-versa.
In summary, the interbank market has a positive eect on the economy.
Indeed, counterbalancing depositors movements, it reduces the implicit loss of
banks' informational capital and increases the overall eciency of the system.
Nevertheless, a highly centralized interbank market amplies the eects of
an exogenous shock in the economy. Indeed, the state of the system heavily
depends on the overall eciency of the core bank and vice-versa.
2.4 Calibration Analysis
ABMs rely on the assumption that economies are complex systems, in which
a large number of heterogeneous agents interact with each other without any
central planner coordinating their actions. The natural corollary to this idea
is that both the dynamics and the distributional properties of the time series
observed in the real world are the outcome of this process of decentralized
interactions (Delli Gatti et al., 2005). As a consequence, this approach to
the study of economics has both the potential and the necessity to validate
its results not only from an aggregate point of view but also from a micro
level.
In this section, we analyze the performance of our model in reproducing
some of the stylized facts characterizing modern economies. We take United
States data as a reference point for the aggregate analysis, while we rely
on the empirical results of previous researches to study the distributional
properties of the system at the micro level. Specically, we analyze both
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the macro and micro attributes of the simulations under the three dierent
network topologies.
The set of parameters employed in the process of validation are chosen to
minimize the degree of subjectivity in the decisional process and to control
for computational times. In particular, we use some common values for the
production function (α = 0.3) and for the one-year discount factor (β =
0.99), while we limit the number of households (nh = 1000), rms (nf =
1000) and nancial intermediaries (ni = 20) for reasons of computational
tractability. As stated in the previous section, the three network topologies
are obtained by simply setting the weight ω, which inuences the measure
of t in the interbank market through equation (2.26), equal to 0 in the
decentralized case, 0.6 in the intermediate context and to 1 in the centralized
one. Subsequently, to let the system converge to the pseudo steady-state, we
run 200 simulations of T = 30000 periods, starting from the same initial
value for the households capital (k0 = 0.001), and we study the dynamics of
the last 15000 observations. Lastly, we calibrate the model by setting the
intermediaries sensitivity γ = 0.015 and the one year time scale Ty = 160.
Indeed, these value best t the real time series at the aggregate level.
2.4.1 Macro Properties
The time series included in the analysis of the aggregate properties of the
simulations are the annual growth rates of real consumption and production
and the one-year real interest rate. In addition, we study also the cyclical
behavior of aggregate production by detrending the logarithm of the time
series in levels through the HodrickPrescott lter. Finally, notice that the
real data is available only at a quarterly frequency. Consequently, we perform
the analysis on the quarterly transformation of the simulated data (see Eq.
2.35).
To begin with the analysis of standard deviations, the model produces
a good replication of the observed values on the real aggregate consump-
tion and production growth rates, while the volatility of the interest rate is
signicantly lower than the observed one (Table 2.1). With regards to the
correlations among these variables (Tables 2.2, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6), the direction
of the co-movements is generally correct in all the specications. However,
the model overestimates the strength of the relation between production and
interest rates.
The situation is dierent when we focus on autocorrelations (Tables 2.3,
2.7, 2.8 and 2.9): with the exception of interest rates, all the other variables
have an autocorrelation coecient lower than the observed one. This de-
parture from the real data is particularly pronounced in the decentralized
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specication of the model. At the same time, all the simulations overes-
timate the eect of past values of production on current returns. On the
contrary, the three specications of the model underestimate the correlation
coecients between interest rates and the past growth rates of production
and consumption. To end with, aggregate returns display a large persistence
as in the real data.
In the last two decades, researchers focused also on the asymmetric be-
havior of business cycles. Sichel (1993) studied the coecient of skewness
of the detrended time series22 of the real aggregate production in the US
economy. The author found a negative value for both these parameters, indi-
cating some deepness and steepness characteristics of the time series. All the
simulations reproduce these aspects, with the centralized specication being
closer to the real data (Table 2.10).
In summary, the two specications reproduce some of the stylized facts
characterizing real-world aggregate time series. In particular, the centralized
simulation seems to be closer to the actual data. Conversely, the major
problems of the model come from the excess reactivity of the system to
changes in the aggregate return and from the low autocorrelation coecient
of consumption and production. The rst issue is due to the lack of other
forms of household income beyond interest rates. As a result, relatively
small changes in investment returns produce large uctuations in savings. In
addition, real world interest rates are aected not only by business cycles, but
also by long-term trends in the technological component of production. The
second point can be addressed by taking into account that we are assuming a
strong process of capital reallocation in the model. A more sticky mechanism
would return more realistic results and reduce most of the noise producing
this outcome. Nevertheless, we believe that this would return only second
order improvements, at the cost of increasing excessively the parametrization
of the model.
2.4.2 Micro Properties
In this section we analyze the micro properties of the system. First, we focus
on the characteristics of the distribution of nancial capital and incomes of
households and rms. Second, we investigate the dynamics of interest rates
at the level of the single intermediary.
Notice that in this analysis we rely on the data of individual simulations
in their original form. In other words, as for the network topology, even if dif-
22Deviations from the trend are obtained by applying the HodrickPrescott lter to the
logarithm of the original time series.
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ferent replication of the model produce dissimilar results, the main properties
of the time series remain the same. In addition, the quarterly transformation
employed in the previous sections (Eq. 2.35) is not necessary here because
we study the cross-sectional characteristics of the data.
A well-known feature of natural and social phenomena is their power law
distribution (Gabaix, 2016). In particular, largest rms follow a power law
statistics, while the remaining part of the system is distributed according to
a log-normal function. This feature has been observed both in terms of pro-
duction/revenues (Axtell, 2001; Ramsden and Kiss-Haypál, 2000; Okuyama
et al., 1999) and of capital employed (Gaeo et al., 2003). This characteristic
is fully reected in our simulations and it holds for all the specications of
the model (Fig. from 2.25 to 2.30). Furthermore, the scale parameter is not
stable over time, but increases during expansions (Gaeo et al., 2003). To
test this feature, we estimate the power law scale factor of the 95th percentile
of the distribution of rms' capital for every time period and we regress it on
the level of production. Given the well-known problem of heteroskedasticity
in estimated dependent variable models and the strong autocorrelation in our
observations, we employ the NeweyWest estimator to overcome this issue in
our ordinary least squares regressions. The results (Table 2.11) conrm this
additional stylized fact: the distribution of rms size is less skewed during
expansions than during recessions.
Since the seminal work of Pareto (1986) (see Persky (1992) for an anal-
ysis) similar patterns have been found also in the distributive properties of
the households wealth and incomes (Clementi and Gallegati, 2005; Clementi
et al., 2006). Also in this case the model replicates these ndings (Fig. from
2.31 to 2.36), with the centralized specication returning a clear conrma-
tion of this fact. In addition, households incomes are more homogeneous
than distribution of wealth (Gabaix, 2016). In this case the decentralized
framework outperforms the centralized and intermediate specications: even
if the tail of the wealth distribution follows a power law, incomes are closer
to a log-normal function (see Fig. 2.33 and 2.36).
Lastly, with regards to investments returns, we plot in Figures 2.37, 2.38
and 2.39 the interest rates paid by the three largest intermediaries in terms
of invested capital. From these graphs emerges clearly that the variance of
aggregate returns is lower than the volatility of the single asset, a standard
behavior of nancial markets. Furthermore, aggregate returns follow the
same path of the largest intermediary in the centralized framework (see the
correlation coecients in the graphs). This result highlights that in this
context exists a market maker which moves all the system and bears most of
the systemic risk.
In addition, interest rates display volatility clustering at the individual
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level (see Cont (2001, 2007) for a discussion on the topic). This feature is
particularly pronounced in the decentralized case, where no agents in the
system have a signicant market power. In view of that, we can consider
the economy in this context closer to a rst best equilibrium. Indeed, inter-
mediaries are quite homogeneous in this case. Consequently, they can not
inuence market prices excessively, bringing the nancial system closer to a
perfectly competitive environment. Therefore, even if the single investment
is more volatile, the aggregate dynamics is smoother. On the contrary, it is
not possible to edge completely idiosyncratic risk in the centralized frame-
work because one asset in the market contains most of the systemic risk. In
other words, the optimal portfolio (the market portfolio) does not exits in
this situation because individual and aggregate risks overlap in the single
investment.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this article, we develop a macroeconomic ABM to study the eects of
dierent topologies of the interbank market on the overall performance of the
economy. Specically, we implement a decentralized matching mechanism to
obtain an endogenous evolution of deposit, credit and interbank relations.
Overall, our model conrms the importance of the interbank market as
an indisputable source of economic development. Indeed, counterbalancing
depositors movements, it reduces the implicit loss of banks' informational
capital and increases the overall eciency of the system. Nevertheless, a
highly centralized network amplies the eects of exogenous shocks in the
economy, a result conrmed also by other researches (Iori et al., 2006; Lenzu
and Tedeschi, 2012; Tedeschi et al., 2012). Indeed, the state of the system
depends heavily on the overall eciency of the core bank and vice-versa. In
particular, the single intermediary in the periphery does not have sucient
resources to sustain a distressed hub in a centralized context. In other words,
the bailout of a core bank would require a perfect coordination of all the other
actors of the market or the direct intervention of the government. In view of
that, a more homogeneous nancial system would be more sustainable and
less subject to large banking crises.
The model can be extended in a number of directions to consider impor-
tant issues. First, we have not included the labor market in this framework
to maintain our analysis as simple as possible. Nevertheless, researchers show
that the mechanism of decentralized matching in the credit sector can have
a large impact also on the level of employment (see Wasmer and Weil (2004)
for a representative agent analysis and Riccetti et al. (2015) for an ABM).
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Accordingly, an extension of our model in this direction would enrich our
economic environment with a fundamental factor of production and would
complete our analysis of welfare. Second, most of the research on inter-
bank and credit networks focused on the role of the nancial accelerator as
an amplier of exogenous shocks (Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Tedeschi et al.,
2012; Riccetti et al., 2013; Grilli et al., 2014, 2015). In view of that, the
introduction of this mechanism in our model would test those results in a
complete economic system in which banks' liabilities are not xed but follow
depositors' behavior.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: Network: Centralized Topology
Figure 2.2: Network: Decentralized Topology
Note: weighted edges (size equal to invested amount). Color Palette: Blue→Households,
Green→Banks, Red→Firms.
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Figure 2.3: Hub of Deposits Market (Centralized)
Note: Normalized ID, in-degree and tness of deposits market hub. Box indicates the
correlation coecient between hub in-degree and t.
Figure 2.4: Hub of Credit Market (Centralized)
Note: Normalized ID, in-degree and tness of credit market hub. Box indicates the
correlation coecient between hub in-degree and t.
62
Figure 2.5: Hub of Interbank Market (Centralized)
Note: Normalized ID, in-degree and tness of interbank market hub. Box indicates the
correlation coecient between hub in-degree and t.
Figure 2.6: Hub of Deposits Market (Decentralized)
Note: Normalized ID, in-degree and tness of deposits market hub. Box indicates the
correlation coecient between hub in-degree and t.
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Figure 2.7: Hub of Credit Market (Decentralized)
Note: Normalized ID, in-degree and tness of credit market hub. Box indicates the
correlation coecient between hub in-degree and t.
Figure 2.8: Hub of Interbank Market (Decentralized)
Note: Normalized ID, in-degree and tness of interbank market hub. Box indicates the
correlation coecient between hub in-degree and t.
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Figure 2.9: Hub of Deposits Market (Intermediate)
Note: Normalized ID, in-degree and tness of deposits market hub. Box indicates the
correlation coecient between hub in-degree and t.
Figure 2.10: Hub of Credit Market (Intermediate)
Note: Normalized ID, in-degree and tness of credit market hub. Box indicates the
correlation coecient between hub in-degree and t.
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Figure 2.11: Hub of Interbank Market (Intermediate)
Note: Normalized ID, in-degree and tness of interbank market hub. Box indicates the
correlation coecient between hub in-degree and t.
Figure 2.12: Duration of Expansions and Recessions
Note: length of periods with positive (black) and negative (gray) growth rates. Box plots
based on 200 simulations.
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Figure 2.13: Depth of Expansions and Recessions
Note: cumulative growth rates of expansions (black) and recessions (gray). Box plots of
absolute values based on 200 simulations.
Figure 2.14: Cross-Correlation of Production and Centrality (Centralized)
Note: cross-correlation between aggregate production and the centrality of deposit, credit
and interbank markets. Average (black lines) and 90% condence intervals (gray lines) of
200 simulations.
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Figure 2.15: Cross-Correlation of Production and Centrality
(Decentralized)
Note: cross-correlation between aggregate production and the centrality of deposit, credit
and interbank markets. Average (black lines) and 90% condence intervals (gray lines) of
200 simulations.
Figure 2.16: Cross-Correlation of Production and Centrality
(Intermediate)
Note: cross-correlation between aggregate production and the centrality of deposit, credit
and interbank markets. Average (black lines) and 90% condence intervals (gray lines) of
200 simulations.
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Figure 2.17: Positive Shock in Aggregate Production (Centralized)
Note: impulse-response function of a positive shock in aggregate production. Average
(solid lines) and 90% condence intervals (shaded areas) of 200 simulations.
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Figure 2.18: Positive Shock in Aggregate Production (Decentralized)
Note: impulse-response function of a positive shock in aggregate production. Average
(solid lines) and 90% condence intervals (shaded areas) of 200 simulations.
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Figure 2.19: Positive Shock in Aggregate Production (Intermediate)
Note: impulse-response function of a positive shock in aggregate production. Average
(solid lines) and 90% condence intervals (shaded areas) of 200 simulations.
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Figure 2.20: Reduction in the Interbank Market Volume (Centralized)
Note: impulse-response function of a negative shock in the interbank market volume.
Average (solid lines) and 90% condence intervals (shaded areas) of 200 simulations.
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Figure 2.21: Reduction in the Interbank Market Volume (Decentralized)
Note: impulse-response function of a negative shock in the interbank market volume.
Average (solid lines) and 90% condence intervals (shaded areas) of 200 simulations.
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Figure 2.22: Reduction in the Interbank Market Volume (Intermediate)
Note: impulse-response function of a negative shock in the interbank market volume.
Average (solid lines) and 90% condence intervals (shaded areas) of 200 simulations.
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Figure 2.23: Long Run Dynamic: Aggregate Production
Average value of 200 simulations.
Figure 2.24: Percentage Deviations from Optimal Steady-State:
Aggregate Production
(Cumulative Distribution Function of Final Observations)
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Table 2.1: Standard Deviations













Note: average standard deviations of 200 simulations for dierent network topologies
(95% condence intervals in brackets).
Table 2.2: Correlation Matrix:
US Data
ŷt ĉt rt
ŷt 1 0.877 0.017
ĉt 0.877 1 0.126




ŷt 0.856 0.834 0.067
ĉt 0.742 0.880 0.172
rt 0.002 0.097 0.956
Note: correlation and autocorrelation of United States annual real interest rates (GS1
less CPI annual growth rate), real aggregate consumption (PCECC96) and production
(GDPC1) growth rates. Data on quarterly frequency from 1953-Q1 to 2018-Q2. Data
retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Note: average correlation of 200 simulations (95% condence intervals in brackets).














Note: average correlation of 200 simulations (95% condence intervals in brackets).














Note: average correlation of 200 simulations (95% condence intervals in brackets).
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Note: average autocorrelation of 200 simulations (95% condence intervals in brackets).











Note: average autocorrelation of 200 simulations (95% condence intervals in brackets).











Note: average autocorrelation of 200 simulations (95% condence intervals in brackets).
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Table 2.10: Deepness and Steepness of Aggregate Production
US Data Centralized Intermediate Decentralized
Deepness −0.39 −0.11 −0.09 −0.09
(−0.40-0.19) (−0.43-0.16) (−0.39-0.14)
Steepness −0.46 −0.09 −0.01 −0.01
(−0.38-0.25) (−0.32-0.28) (−0.29-0.22)
Note: average coecient of skewness of detrended time series (deepness) and growth rates
(steepness). Average of 200 simulations (95% condence intervals in brackets).
Table 2.11: Power Law and Aggregate Production
Model: OLS (T = 15000)
Dependent variable: Power Law Scale Parameter (95th Percentile)
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 18 (Bartlett kernel)
Centralized
Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
Intercept 0.9118 0.1392 6.546 <0.0001
Production 6.1740e-05 4.8906e-06 12.62 <0.0001
Intermediate
Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
Intercept 0.2371 0.2688 0.8822 0.3777
Production 9.0495e-05 9.3877e-06 9.640 <0.0001
Decentralized
Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
Intercept 0.6461 0.1773 3.645 0.0003
Production 7.9350e-05 6.4643e-06 12.28 <0.0001
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Figure 2.25: Distribution of Firms Production (Centralized)
Figure 2.26: Distribution of Firms Production (Intermediate)
Figure 2.27: Distribution of Firms Production (Decentralized)
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Figure 2.28: Distribution of Firms Capital (Centralized)
Figure 2.29: Distribution of Firms Capital (Intermediate)
Figure 2.30: Distribution of Firms Capital (Decentralized)
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Figure 2.31: Distribution of Households Wealth (Centralized)
Figure 2.32: Distribution of Households Wealth (Intermediate)
Figure 2.33: Distribution of Households Wealth (Decentralized)
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Figure 2.34: Distribution of Households Income (Centralized)
Figure 2.35: Distribution of Households Income (Intermediate)
Figure 2.36: Distribution of Households Income (Decentralized)
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Figure 2.37: Volatility Clustering
(Centralized)
Figure 2.38: Volatility Clustering
(Intermediate)
Figure 2.39: Volatility Clustering
(Decentralized)
Note: interest rates of the three largest intermediaries (gray line) and aggregate returns




Since the seminal work of Arrow and Debreu (1954), all innovations in the
nancial sector have been welcomed as a positive determinant of economic
development and risk management. In fact, from a theoretical point of view,
it is possible to achieve the rst-best equilibrium in which all states of the
world are perfectly edged and correctly priced through an ecient allocation
of funds. For this reason, every development of nancial markets, moving
the system closer to a complete market condition, was acclaimed as positive
news. As a result, this sector has played an increasing importance in real
economies during the last three decades.
This process, called nancialization, captured the interest of researchers
in recent time (Palley, 2013). Before the Great Recession in 2009, nancial
institutions were relegated to the role of simple shock ampliers (Bernanke
and Gertler, 1989; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997)
or indisputable growth enhancers (Levine, 2005). However, both the size
and the characteristics of the crisis capsized those results. New models of
business uctuations were developed, in which nancial intermediaries do
not simply react passively to shocks, but act strategically to improve their
prots (Christiano and Ikeda, 2011) or preserve their liquidity (Brunnermeier
et al., 2013). Furthermore, recent studies found a non-linear relation between
aggregate growth and debt (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Arcand et al.,
2015) or a statistically insignicant or even negative impact of nancializa-
tion on xed investments (Davis, 2017). Similarly, also the role of nancial
institutions as macro stabilizers has been questioned (Dabla-Norris and Sriv-
isal, 2013). In particular, the greater interconnection between intermediaries,
while reducing the idiosyncratic risk, has been associated with increased sys-
temic risk (Battiston et al., 2012b; Lenzu and Tedeschi, 2012; Grilli et al.,
2015; Berardi and Tedeschi, 2017). Overall, research found a dangerous asso-
ciation between nancialization and the reduction of aggregate growth, the
increase in income inequality and the overall nancial fragility of Western
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economies (Palley, 2013).
In this article, we develop a simple model to study the eects of nan-
cialization on aggregate growth and systemic risk. While close in the spirit
to the work of Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015), the theoretical framework
introduced here focus on the role of nancial institutions as physical cap-
ital attractors instead of employers of skilled workers. The main driver of
the underlying mechanism is the bargaining power of the intermediaries.
Indeed, nancial institutions, by absorbing a larger quota of income from
entrepreneurs, can reduce the incentive for new rms to enter the market.
Because of that, both the long-term growth rate and the overall stability of
the system can be negatively aected by an overdeveloped nancial sector.
In Section 3.2 we present the theoretical results of a simple endogenous
growth model with expanding variety. The main departure from the existing
literature is due to the presence of a nancial intermediary with a given level
of bargaining power. As a consequence, a non-linear relation emerges between
the aggregate growth rate and the leverage of the system. Subsequently, in
Section 3.3 we focus on systemic risk. In particular, nancial institutions,
by capturing a larger quota of expected production, do not only reduce the
number of entrepreneurs but modify also the quality of their portfolio of
credits. Overall, these results are in line with the observed reduction in
the growth rates and the increased nancial fragility of Western economies.
Finally, Section 3.4 concludes and states some directions for future research.
3.2 Bargaining Power and Growth
The bargaining power of the nancial sector can inuence the growth rate of
the economy. Indeed, dierent redistribution of incomes between the own-
ers and the creditors of rms can produce dissimilar equilibria when en-
trepreneurship and credit are complements. This is due to the power of -
nancial intermediaries to modify the incentive for new entrepreneurs to enter
the market.
The model is a stylized version of the vast economic literature on expand-
ing variety and endogenous growth (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman,
1991). Indeed, the idea is not to demonstrate how the entry mechanism of
new rms or machinery in the market modies the long-term growth po-
tential, but how the nancial sector can aect this process of new products
creation. In a similar manner, also the literature on R&D and Schumpete-
rian evolution can be included in this context (Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
Indeed, the main driver of our model is the ability of the nancial sector
to aect both the aggregate interest rate and the protability of rms and
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investments. Therefore, intermediaries, by modifying the current value of
projects, can reduce or increase the incentive for new entrepreneurs to enter
the market. In that sense, this framework can be extended to every model
which includes a comparison between the current value of an investment and
its cost.
Consider a closed economy populated by a representative household, a
nancial institution and a potentially innite number of rms. The family
is the owner of capital, which is for simplicity the only factor of production.
The household can invest its resources in the nancial institution (Dt+1) or
can sustain a xed cost (F ) to start a new entrepreneurial activity. There
are no limits on the number of new rms, hence the overall cost of starting
a new set of market activities is given by the product:
F∆Nt = F (Nt+1 −Nt) (3.1)
where Nt is the number of enterprises at time t. Accordingly, the aggregate
investment in the privately owned rms (Et+1) is equal to the xed cost F
multiplied by the total number of market activities Nt+1:
Et+1 = FNt+1 (3.2)
Assume for simplicity that there are no risk or uncertainty and that all






βt log (Ct) (3.3)
under the budget constraint:
Dt+1 + Ct + F (Nt+1 −Nt) ≤ (1 + rt)Dt + πtNt (3.4)
where Ct is consumption, rt the return on the investment Dt and πt is the






Ct = (1− β) [(1 + rt)Dt + (πt + F )Nt] (3.6)
Dt+1 + FNt+1 = β [(1 + rt)Dt + (πt + F )Nt] (3.7)
Notice that equation (3.5) is a no-arbitrage condition. Indeed, in steady-
state or along a balanced growth path the cost of investing in a new rm
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With regards to production, the only input is capital (kt+1), which is
provided by the nancial sector. In fact, enterprises have no resources of
their own to start production, but they can borrow them at the economy-
wide interest rate rt+1 because of the total absence of risk
23. Finally, the
production technology follows a common functional form with decreasing
marginal returns:
yt+1 = (kt+1)
α with 0 < α < 1 (3.9)
In contrast with the solution of perfect competition, rms do not simply
maximize prots:
πt+1 = (kt+1)
α − rt+1kt+1 (3.10)
by taking the interest rate as given, but instead interact with the nancial
institution to deal the conditions of the loan. Specically, the intermediary
has a given level of contractual power (θ ∈ [0, 1]) and every period the two





α − rt+1Nt+1kt+1)1−θ (3.11)
under the budget constraint:
Nt+1kt+1 ≤ Dt+1 (3.12)
In other words, as in the literature on wage determination in the labor
market (see for example Pissarides (2000)), the bargaining power θ captures
the ability of the nancial institution to extract resources from its borrowers.


















23Moreover, rms do not need equity to cover the risk of default.
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By inserting equations (3.14) and (3.15) in the no-arbitrage condition










=⇒ θ = Dt+1
Et+1 +Dt+1
(3.16)
Consequently, the general equilibrium is characterized by a balanced
growth path:
g = β(1 + r)− 1 (3.17)
r = (θ)α(1− θ)1−α(F )α−1 (3.18)
where g is the long term growth rate.
The bargaining power of the intermediary is fully reected in the overall
leverage of the system (Eq. 3.16). Indeed, a strong nancial sector can absorb
a large fraction of income from its borrowers and can pay a higher return
to its investors. Consequently, households prefer to deposit their wealth in
an intermediary rather than investing directly in an economic activity. Put
dierently, in a closed economy an expansion of the nancial sector is the
result of an increase in its bargaining power. In fact, dierent allocations of
funds would not be incentive-compatible.




= 0 =⇒ θ = α (3.19)
d2g
dθ2
= −β(1− α)α(1− θ)−1−αθ−2+α(F )α−1 < 0 (3.20)
This non-linear relationship between leverage and growth rates emerges
also from Figure 3.1. This is due to the strong complementarity between
credit and entrepreneurship. On the one hand, a relatively weak and under-
developed nancial sector is not able to capture a suciently high fraction of
income from the economy. Therefore, real interest rates are low, households
do not have the incentive to save and new rms do not have access to capital
and can not start production. Overall, the economy remains at a low or
negative growth path. On the other hand, a strong nancial sector reduces
the incentive for new entrepreneurs to enter the market. Indeed, prots are
too low and households prefer to invest their wealth in the nancial market
rather than starting a new entrepreneurial activity. Also in this case the
economy remains at a low or negative growth path because of the decreasing
marginal productivity of capital. To end with, as expected a reduction in the
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cost F of starting a new enterprise has a positive eect on the growth rate
of the system.
Summing up, the nancial sector can have a strong impact on the long-
term growth potential. In fact, intermediaries, by modifying the incentives
for new entrepreneurs to enter the market or for incumbents to develop a
new product or innovation, can either reduce or increase the overall process of
economic development. In addition, it also emerges that this mechanism may
be more pronounced for enterprises which are heavily dependent on external
funding or are in sectors characterized by a high level of R&D (Cecchetti and
Kharroubi, 2012, 2015).
3.3 Bargaining Power and Risk
In the previous section, we show that a non-linear relation between the lever-
age of the system and the growth rate can emerge when entrepreneurship and
credit are complements. Accordingly, a similar pattern can be found also be-
tween systemic risk and the bargaining power of intermediaries. In fact,
nancial institutions can modify the incentive for new entrepreneurs to enter
the market by absorbing a larger quota of rms' expected production. In
this way, only less risk-averse investors start a risky activity, while the re-
maining part of the households prefer to deposit their resources in a nancial
institution at a risk-free rate.
Consider a closed economy in which a continuum of households/investors
must choose between investing their endowment (e) in a risky enterprise or
in a risk-free deposit. In particular, agents evaluate the opportunity to start
a new privately owned rm (entrepreneurs) or not (depositors). In addition,
households can not build a portfolio containing the two assets or, in other
words, they can not be both entrepreneurs and depositors at the same time.
Agents have an heterogeneous aversion to risk, which is measured for
simplicity in terms of their Sharpe Ratio (Sharpe, 1966). Specically, the
i-th household invest in the risky activity if:
E[ri]− rf√
V ar(ri)







where ri and rf are the returns of the risky rm and of the riskless deposit.
Notice that agents are ordered in accordance to their Sharpe Ratio, which
is distributed uniformly across the population. In particular, risk propensi-







24The maximum value is set equal to 1σ to normalize results.
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Lastly, all the agents have the same discount rate (β). Hence, the long





As stated before, the return paid by the risky asset is simply given by the
excess prot obtained from investing the endowment e in a privately owned
rm, namely:
rie = πi = z(di + e)







where di is the debt borrowed at the risk-free rate rf and z is a random
variable following a log-normal distribution with expected value E[z] = 1
and variance V ar(z) = σ2. As before, the production function is a common
functional form with decreasing marginal productivity.
Deposits are collected by a single nancial institution, which has a given
level of contractual power (θ ∈ [0, 1]). Every period the intermediary solves



















edi = Ds (3.26)
where Dd is the overall demand of credit, Ds the supply of deposits and
I the set of entrepreneurs. Notice that the set I is taken as given in the
maximization process: this will allow to demonstrate later how investors and
the nancial institution can have conicting objectives.
As in the previous section, the higher the bargaining power of the inter-
mediary, the larger the quota of income which it can acquire, with the only
dierence in this case that the nal objective is the expected value of pro-
duction. The solution to the above problem is simply given by the condition:
di = d ∀ i ∈ I (3.27)








edi = Ds (3.29)
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To end with, the intermediary does not have any equity to cover the credit
risk of its portfolio. Because of this, it imposes an additional constraints on
its borrowers (Edge Condition):
rfd ≤ e ∀ i ∈ I (3.30)
In other words, the equity of enterprises has to be suciently high to cover
the payment of interests in any situation. In this way, the intermediary is
able to issue a perfectly risk-free asset to depositors.
The general equilibrium is given by the set of entrepreneurs I, the en-
dowment e and the individual debt d compatible with the long term risk-free
interest rate rf (Eq. 3.22).
To start with, by substituting equations (3.24) and (3.28) into (3.21) it
is possible to nd the set of entrepreneurs I:





I = [0, ī] with ī =




where ī is the marginal entrepreneur. As expected, only the households with
a low aversion to risk invest in the risky enterprise25. In this way the equation









Subsequently, the individual debt d can be found by rewriting the endow-











The overall credit issued (D), the individual (e) and aggregate capital
(E), the leverage of the system (λ) and the marginal investor (̄i) are equal













































































As in the previous section, the leverage of the system λ is an increasing
function of the bargaining power of the nancial sector (Eq. 3.39). In ad-
dition, both the aggregate capital E and debt D follow a non-linear pattern
(see Fig. 3.2). In fact, given the decreasing marginal productivity of capital,
the intermediary must issue a reduced amount of credit when its contrac-
tual power is low to obtain a suciently high return from its loans. Con-
sequently, because of the strong complementarity between debt and capital
(see Eq. 3.35), also the latter is upper constrained. In this way, the economy
remains in a situation of low capitalization and production. However, as
the bargaining power of the intermediary increases, this process of economic
development reaches a turning point. Indeed, above a certain threshold the
growth of credit and deposits protability is more than compensated by the
reduction in the number of entrepreneurs (Eq. 3.36).
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With regards to income distribution, expected production and the corre-
sponding quota to entrepreneurs and the intermediary are:














E[Π] = (1− θ)E[Y ] (3.44)
rfD = θE[Y ] (3.45)














θ) = 0 =⇒ θY = (α)2 (3.46)
dE[Π]
dθ
= −E[Y ] + (1− θ)dE[Y ]
dθ
=⇒ θE < θY (3.47)
drfD
dθ
= E[Y ] + θ
dE[Y ]
dθ
=⇒ θD > θY (3.48)
The three maxima are at dierent levels of the bargaining power of the
nancial sector (see Fig. 3.3). In particular, entrepreneurs prefer a situation
in which the intermediary has a low contractual power (θE), while the latter
opts for a completely opposite solution (θD). However, both the agents select
an equilibrium point where the expected production is not at its maximum
(θE < θY < θD).
Lastly, the main aim of this model is to study the nexus between the
contractual power of the nancial sector and systemic risk. This relation can
be assessed under two dierent viewpoints.
First, with regards to the edge condition (Eq. 3.30), in equilibrium this
constraint implies:









From this equation emerges that there is a maximum value of the con-
tractual power above which the equity of the rms is not sucient to cover
business uctuations. Indeed, when the bargaining power of the nancial
institution is high, entrepreneurs invest a small number of resources in the
system to obtain an incentive-compatible return. Consequently, the equity
of the rms is excessively low to cover the volatility of production. Put dif-
ferently, is not possible to issue a completely risk-free instrument when the
leverage of the system is high. In addition, the optimal bargaining power of
the intermediary (θD) is the closest to this value. In this sense, when the risk-
free interest rate is high and, in turn, this threshold is low, the nal objective
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of the nancial institution can be in contrast with the type of instrument it
issues (risk-free deposits). Similarly, an exogenous increase in the risk-free
interest rate can transform a riskless deposit in a risky asset. Overall, a large
nancial sector can be compatible with low returns, but unexpected changes
in the risk-free rate can jeopardize the solvability of intermediaries.
Second, an increase in the bargaining power of the nancial institution
reduces the set of entrepreneurs (Eq. 3.36). This produces two negative
eects on the riskiness of the system. Firstly, by reducing the number of
active rms it decreases the diversication of the portfolio of credits. In
fact, with only idiosyncratic risk being present in the system, extreme events
are rarer when the number of investments rises. Second, an increase in the
contractual power does not only modify the quantity but also the quality
of the entrepreneurs (as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) with interest rates).
Indeed, only less risk-averse households remain in the market. Overall, the
growth of the contractual power of the intermediary can have a negative
impact on systemic risk. This aspect is conrmed by the ratio between the












which is a decreasing function of the bargaining power of the intermediary
(Fig. 3.4).
Summing up, an excessively large nancial sector may not have a negative
impact only on growth and expected production, but also on the solvability
of the intermediaries and systemic risk. In addition, the search for returns of
nancial institutions can move the system to a suboptimal equilibrium with
low production and high volatility.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this article we develop a simple theoretical framework to study the eects
of the bargaining power of the nancial sector on the aggregate growth and
the systemic risk. With regards to the former, the results are in line with the
existing empirical evidence (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Arcand et al.,
2015; Davis, 2017). On the contrary, the model returns a denitively negative
relation between the volatility of the economy and the overall leverage. It is
clear that this outcome is in contrast with the literature (Dabla-Norris and
Srivisal, 2013). However, the theoretical framework introduced here does not
contain any reference to the equity and, in turn, to the protability of the
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intermediary itself. Indeed, the results of the model would denitively change
introducing this additional investment opportunity for the households.
In addition, we consider the contractual power of the intermediary as
an exogenous variable. In other words, we do not evaluate the factors in-
uencing this parameter (e.g. the institutional and legal framework, the
market structure and technological improvements) and their consequences
on the protability of intermediaries. Therefore, additional work is required
to complete the model. Furthermore, this could also explain the constant
protability of the US nancial sector over the last century (Philippon, 2015).
Lastly, in this article we focus only on the eects of nancialization on
aggregate growth and systemic risk. Another important feature of this long-
run dynamic is the increased inequality of Western economies (Piketty and
Saez, 2003; Palley, 2013; Stiglitz, 2015a). Accordingly, further investigation
is needed, focusing in particular on the causal link between these two phe-
nomena.
Summing up, the contractual power of the nancial sector and its expres-
sion through the overall leverage of the system can have a strong impact both
on the aggregate growth and the systemic risk. Indeed, dierent allocations
of funds modify the incentive for new enterprises to enter the market. In
other words, nancial institutions do not simply function as mere transfers
of funds but they can modify the structure of the economic system through
their behavior. As a result, the policymaker should be aware of the poten-
tially negative consequences that an overdeveloped nancial sector can have
on the real economy.
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3.5 Figures
Figure 3.1: Growth Rates and Bargaining Power
{α = 0.3 ∧ β = 0.95}
Figure 3.2: Capital, Debt and Bargaining Power
{α = 0.3 ∧ β = 0.95 ∧ σ = 0.001}
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Figure 3.3: Income Distribution and Bargaining Power
{α = 0.3 ∧ β = 0.95 ∧ σ = 0.001}
Figure 3.4: Expected Production, Risk and Bargaining Power
{α = 0.3 ∧ β = 0.95 ∧ σ = 0.001}
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Conclusions
The thesis investigates the role of the nancial and credit markets in shaping
the capital structure of the real economy and their eects on the aggregate
performance of the system. In particular, the level of competition in these
sectors seems to be an important aspect of the overall picture. Indeed, the
interplay between nancial institutions can inuence the process of resources
allocation and, in turn, the dynamic of cycles and the long-term growth rate.
First, in Chapter 1 we show that the search for prots of banks can gen-
erate endogenous uctuations because of the strategic complementarity in
their behavior. Indeed, the single nancial institution may have the incen-
tive to reduce its interest rate on new credits in the short term. In fact,
that would increase the eciency of its portfolio by reducing the volume of
unallocated resources. However, that prompts the immediate response of the
other intermediaries. Indeed the new funding conditions attract not only new
rms but also incumbent entrepreneurs. As a result, the demand for credit
in other banks decreases, thus leading to a further reduction in interest rates.
Summing up, this produces a withdrawal of resources by the households and
a sudden decrease of aggregate capital and production.
Second, the structure of the interbank network can generate a competitive
advantage for lenders of this market. Indeed, when nancial institutions
borrow from other intermediaries, they use their portfolio of credits to rms
as collateral. However, entrepreneurs can extinguish their existing loans if
they nd a better nancing opportunity in the market. As a result, banks
may incur further losses because the collateral no longer covers the payment
of interests on interbank loans. Moreover, when intermediaries select their
counterparties on the basis of their size, by construction, they do so regardless
of the ask interest rate. Summing up, only the hub exploits these mechanisms
in a highly centralized context and pays, on average, a higher return to
its investors. In this way, it attracts more households and reinforces its
market position. Nevertheless, this network topology is subject to large and
persistent uctuations. Indeed, the state of the system depends on the overall
eciency of the core bank and vice-versa. In particular, when the hub suers
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a sudden withdrawal of resources, the single intermediary in the periphery
does not have sucient resources to sustain it. In other words, the bailout of
a core bank would require a perfect coordination of all the other actors of the
market or the direct intervention of the government. In the absence of that,
the hub closes a considerable number of credit lines, with a massive loss of
informational capital and a substantial reduction in the overall productivity
of the economy.
Lastly, the bargaining power and, in a similar way, competition in the -
nancial sector can inuence the growth rate of the economy. Indeed, nancial
intermediaries, modifying the redistribution of income between the owners
and the creditors of rms, can change the incentive for new entrepreneurs to
enter the market. Specically, when bank are subject to a strong competi-
tion, they are not able to capture a suciently high fraction of income from
the economy. Therefore, real interest rates are low, households do not have
the incentive to save and new rms do not have access to capital and can not
start production. Overall, the economy remains at a low or negative growth
path. On the other hand, a pseudo-monopolistic nancial sector reduces the
incentive for new entrepreneurs to enter the market. Indeed, prots are too
low and households prefer to invest their wealth in the nancial market rather
than starting a new entrepreneurial activity. Also in this case the economy
remains at a low or negative growth path because of the decreasing marginal
productivity of capital.
Summing up, the level of competition in the nancial market seems to
aect the allocation of capital in the economy. In particular, a pseudo-
monopolistic banking sector
The work is far from being complete and it can be extended in a number
of directions to consider important issues. With regards to the two ABMs,
we have not included the labor market in these frameworks to maintain our
analysis as simple as possible. Nevertheless, researchers show that the mech-
anism of decentralized matching in the credit sector can have a large impact
also on the level of employment (see Wasmer and Weil (2004) for a repre-
sentative agent analysis and Riccetti et al. (2015) for an ABM). Accordingly,
an extension of our model in this direction would enrich our economic envi-
ronment with a fundamental factor of production and would complete our
analysis of welfare. In addition, most of the research on interbank and credit
networks focused on the role of the nancial accelerator as an amplier of ex-
ogenous shocks (Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Tedeschi et al., 2012; Riccetti et al.,
2013; Grilli et al., 2014, 2015). In view of that, the introduction of this mech-
anism in our model would test those results in a complete economic system
in which banks' liabilities are not xed but follow depositors' behavior.
Conversely, with regards to the representative agent model, the theoreti-
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cal framework introduced here does not contain any reference to the equity
and, in turn, to the protability of intermediaries. Indeed, the results of the
model would denitively change introducing this additional investment op-
portunity for the households. Moreover, we consider the contractual power
of the intermediary as an exogenous variable. In other words, we do not
evaluate the factors inuencing this parameter (e.g. the institutional and
legal framework, the market structure and technological improvements) and
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